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SUMMARY 
 
Section 23 of the Constitution provides that everyone has a right to fair labour 
practice.  The constitutional right to fair labour practices includes the right not to be 
unfairly dismissed and is given effect to by section 185 of the LRA.  
 
The constitutional right not to be unfairly dismissed is given effect to by Chapter VIII 
of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA), which provides a remedy for an 
unfair dismissal.  Schedule 8 of the LRA contains a “Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal”, which the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (the 
CCMA) and the Labour Courts must take into account when determining the fairness 
of a dismissal. 
 
The LRA expressly recognises three grounds for termination of the 
employment contract namely; misconduct on the part of the employee, incapacity 
due to an employee’s poor work performance, ill health or injury and termination due 
an employer’s operational requirements. In terms of the LRA, a dismissal must be 
procedurally and substantively fair.  The requirements for procedural and substantive 
fairness are contained in Schedule 8 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal. 
 
The provisions of section 185 of the LRA apply to all employers and employees in 
both the public and the private sectors, with the exception of members of the National 
Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency, the South African Secret Service 
and the South African National Academy of Intelligence.  
 
Section 213 of the LRA defines an “employee” as any person, excluding an 
independent contractor, who works for another person or for the State and who 
receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration and any person who in any 
manner assists in carrying out or conducting the business of an employer.  Section 
200A of the LRA sets out the presumption as to who is an employee.  This is a 
guideline to assist in determining who is an employee. 
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The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (the BCEA) sets minimum terms 
and conditions of employment including the notice of termination of employment. 
 
Under the common law an employment contract of employment can be terminated on 
either the expiration of the agreed period of employment or on completion of the 
specified task in cases of fixed-term contracts.  Also, in terms of general contract 
principles an employment contract may be terminated by notice duly given by either 
party or by summary termination in the event of a material breach on the part of 
either party.  
 
The death of either party may terminate the employment contract.  However, the 
death of an employer will not necessarily lead to the contract’s termination.  
 
An employment contract may also terminate by operation of law or effluxion of time 
namely retirement and coming into being of fixed-term contracts, by mutual 
agreement, employee resigning, due to insolvency of the employer and due to 
supervening impossibility of performance.  
 
In the circumstances indicated above, the termination of the contract of employment 
does not constitute dismissal.  This means that the CCMA and the Labour Court do 
not have jurisdiction to determine should the employee allege that his or her 
dismissal was unfair.  It has been argued that the instances where a termination of a 
contract of employment is terminated, but there is no dismissal should be scrutinised 
to avoid a situation where employees are deprived of protection afforded by the 
fundamental right not to be unfairly dismissed.  
 
There have been some instances where employment contracts contain clauses that 
provide for automatic termination of employment contracts.  It has been held by the 
courts in various decisions that such clauses are against public policy and thus 
invalid.  The Labour Court stated that a contractual device that renders the 
termination of a contract something other than a dismissal is exactly the exploitation 
the LRA prohibits. 
 
v 
There are various court decisions providing guidelines of circumstances in which 
termination of employment may be regarded as not constituting dismissal.  The main 
focus of the treatise is to discuss these instances and critically analyse the approach 
taken by forums like the CCMA, bargaining councils and the Labour Court in dealing 
with such instances. 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Under the common law there was not much protection for an employee against unfair 
dismissal.1  If the employer gave the employee the required notice of termination of 
employment, the employee generally had no recourse, however, unfair the reason for 
the dismissal might have been.  This was aptly captured by the court in Key Delta v 
Marriner2 where the court had this to say: 
 
“It may be so (though I make no finding on the question) that under the common law a 
contract of employment may give the employer the right to dismiss an employee for 
any reason, or indeed for no reason at all, provided that proper notice is given where 
notice is required.’ 
 
The employer was required to give notice of termination of employment in terms of 
the contract, in order for the termination to be valid or lawful. In essence, the key 
issue under the common law was whether the employee had been given a notice or 
not.  The basis of this principle was anchored on the assumption of equal bargaining 
strength between the employer and the employee.  That this assumption is 
erroneous was emphasized by Davis and Friedland3 in Kahn-Freund’s Labour and 
the Law this way: 
 
“[T]he relation between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is typically a 
relation between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power.  In its 
inception it is an act of submission, in its operation, it is a condition of subordination.” 
 
The assumption that there is equal bargaining strength between an employer and an 
employee and consequently that the parties freely entered into the terms that 
regulate the employment relationship resulted in some deficiencies under the 
common-law when it came to stability and security of employment on the part of the 
employee. 
 
                                                     
1  Van Niekerk Law@work 2nd ed (2012) 213. 
2  [1998] 6 BLLR 647 (E)  
3  Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law (1983) 18. 
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To address these common law deficiencies, statutory intervention in the form of 
legislation like the Basic Conditions of Employment Act4 (hereinafter referred to as 
the BCEA”), the Labour Relations Act5 (hereinafter referred to as “the LRA”), the 
Employment Equity Act6 (hereinafter referred to as “the Employment Equity Act”) 
have been pivotal in addressing the inherent inequality in the employment 
relationship.  
 
Section 23(1) of the Constitution7 provides that everyone has the right to fair labour 
practices.  The LRA8 gives effect to this constitutional right by providing that every 
employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed.  The LRA9 further provides that a 
dismissal must be substantively and procedurally fair. In essence, legislation brings 
in an element of fairness to the employment relationship.  This shows a radical 
departure from the common law position where the only requirement for the 
termination of a contract of employment was whether the termination was lawful or 
not.  This requirement was met if the requisite notice of the termination of 
employment contract was provided. 
 
The courts have also acknowledged the deficiencies of the common law with respect 
to the protection of employees in the context of the employment relationship, 
especially in the context of dismissal.  The courts have also indicated that the 
common law principles must be developed to be in line with the Constitution.  In 
Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt10 the court had this to say: 
 
“It might be that an implied right not to be unfairly dismissed was imported into the 
common law employment relationship by the Constitution.”’ 
 
In Old Mutual Assurance Co SA v Gumbi11 the court held that a pre-dismissal hearing 
was also incorporated into the employee’s employment contract.  According to the 
                                                     
4  Act 75 of 1997. 
5  Act 66 0f 1995. 
6  Act 55 of 1998. 
7  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.  
8  S 185(a). 
9  S 188(1). 
10  [2001] 12 BLLR 1301 (A). 
11  [2007] 8 BLLR 699 (SCA). 
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court, the common law contract of employment had been developed in accordance 
with the Constitution to include a right to a pre-dismissal hearing. 
 
This approach was further taken a step further in Murray v Minister of Defence12 
where the court had to determine whether a member of the South African National 
Defence Force who had resigned because of an intolerable employment relationship 
had been constructively dismissed.  It must be noted that SANDF members are not 
covered by the LRA.13  It is worth noting that under the common law the concept of a 
constructive dismissal does not exist.  If an employee resigns there is no dismissal. 
On the other hand, in terms of section 186(1) (e) of the LRA an employee who 
resigns because the employer has made continued employment intolerable can 
make a claim of a dismissal.  The court held that a contractual right not to be 
constructively dismissed existed.  It further held that this was based on the 
development of common law contract principles in the light of section 23 of the 
Constitution.  In this regard the court averred that the Constitution imposed on all 
employers a duty of “fair dealing” at all times with the employees even those 
employees not covered by the LRA. 
 
In SAMSA v McKenzie14 the court rejected the contention that the common law 
needs to be developed by importing into contracts of employment generally rights 
flowing from the constitutional right to fair labour practices.  According to the court the 
enactment of section 185 of the LRA gave effect to the constitutional right to fair 
labour practice in that in the employment relationship an employee has a right to be 
dismissed fairly.  Giving effect to this right meant that there was no need to further 
develop the common law for employees already covered by the LRA as this would 
result in duplication of rights.  For employees not covered by the LRA, such a need 
would be relevant. 
 
It is worth noting that for an employee to rely on the protection offered by the LRA in 
the context of a dismissal claim, the existence of a dismissal must first be 
                                                     
12  (2008) 29 ILJ 1369 (SCA). 
13  S 2(a). 
14  [2010] 3 ALL SA 1 (SCA). 
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established.15  It is only then that the LRA provisions that a dismissal must be 
substantively and procedurally fair, will find application.  
 
However, there are instances where the employment relationship may be terminated 
but such a termination may not constitute a dismissal.  These include resignations, 
desertion, expiry of contracts of employment due to effluxion of time or completion of 
projects and so on.  The main purpose of the treatise is to critically analyse the 
instances where termination of a contract of employment falls outside the meaning of 
dismissal as contemplated by the LRA.  Since the termination of the employment 
contract under these circumstances would fall outside the meaning of dismissal as 
provided by the LRA,16 the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration 
(hereinafter referred to as “the CCMA”) and the Labour Court do not have jurisdiction 
to arbitrate or adjudicate such terminations.  The study will also look at how the 
courts have provided guidance on how such cases must be strictly interpreted in 
order to avoid a situation where parties to an employment relationship may contract 
out of the protection offered by the LRA and other legislation. 
 
Chapter Two below analyses the nature of the employment relationship. Chapter 
Three below will focus on resignations. Chapter four below deals with the termination 
of the employment contract as a result of death of either the employer or the 
employee. Chapter Five below focusses on desertion in the private sector local 
government and public sector. Chapter Six below deals with the transfer of the 
employment contact as result of insolvency. Chapter Seven below analyses the 
termination of employment due to effluxion of time namely retirement and coming into 
being of fixed-term contracts. Chapter Eight will focus on the legality of automatic 
termination of employment contracts clauses. Lastly, Chapter nine deals with the 
conclusion. 
  
                                                     
15  S192. 
16  S 186. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE NATURE OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
 
This chapter will deal with the parties to the employment relationship and also the 
nature of the employment relationship.  The contract of employment is the foundation 
of the relationship between an employee and his or her employer.  The existence of 
the employment relationship is the starting point for the application of all labour laws. 
If there is no employment relationship between the parties, labour laws do not apply 
to that relationship. 
 
2.1  WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE? 
 
A number of different definitions exist which differ from the common law position as 
to who should be regarded as an “employee”.  Focus will be placed on the definition 
of ‘employee’ as provided in the LRA17 and the BCEA.18  The relevance and the 
importance of the definition is because of the fact that only an employee as defined in 
the LRA19 is entitled to protection against an unfair dismissal  in terms of the LRA and 
if the person is not an employee, the CCMA and  the Labour Court will not have 
jurisdiction to deal with the matter.  
 
In terms of the LRA and the BCEA, an employee is defined as: 
 
“(a)  any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person 
or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and  
 
(b)  any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of an employer.”  
 
The issue of who is an employee is pertinent, on a daily basis the commissioners of 
the CCMA are faced with a challenge of ascertaining whether the person seeking 
relief is an employee or not.20 
                                                     
17  S 213 of LRA. 
18  S 1 of  BCEA. 
19  S 213. 
20  Basson; Christianson; Garbers; Le Roux; Mischke and Strydom Essential Labour Law (2005) 
21. 
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In Discovery Health Limited v CCMA & others21 the LC had to deal with the question 
of whether workers working without the required permit were regarded as employees 
in terms of the LRA since they were working in terms of unlawful employment 
contracts.  In this case, the employee was a national of Argentina who worked in 
South Africa for Discovery Health.  The employer terminated the employment 
contract after it learnt that the employee did not have a legal work permit.  The 
employee approached the CCMA for relief, the employer argued that the CCMA did 
not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter since the employment contract was 
invalid and therefore the employee did not enjoy protection of the LRA. 
 
The court ruled that the Immigration Act22 does not say that employment contract 
concluded without the necessary permit is void.  It highlighted the fact that the Act 
criminalizes the employment of a foreigner without the necessary permit and that the 
criminal aspect focuses on the employer not the employee.  Further to that the court 
held that if the contract would be regarded as void, the employee would be left 
without remedy from instances where employers would deliberately employ foreign 
nationals and simply refuse to pay them, claiming that the contract is not valid.  
 
2.2  STATUTORY PRESUMPTION 
 
In order to assist with this pertinent question of who is an employee, the LRA23 
provides a rebuttable presumption of who is an employee.  
 
“200A. Presumption as to who is employee 
 
(1)  Until the contrary is proved, a person, who works for or renders services to any 
other person, is presumed, regardless of the form of the contract, to be an 
employee, if any one or more of the following factors are present: 
 
(a)  the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction 
of another person; 
(b)  the person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another 
person; 
                                                     
21  [2008] 7 BLLR 633 LC. 
22  13 of 2002. 
23  S 200A. 
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(c)  in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms 
part of that organisation; 
(d)  the person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 40 
hours per month over the last three months; 
(e)  the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or 
she works or renders services; 
(f)  the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the other 
person; or 
(g)  the person only works for or renders services to one person.” 
 
(2)  Subsection (1) does not apply to any person who earns in excess of the amount 
determined by the Minister in terms of section 6(3) of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act. 
 
(3)  If a proposed or existing work arrangement involves persons who earn amounts 
equal to or below the amounts determined by the Minister in terms of section 6(3) 
of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, any of the contracting parties may 
approach the Commission for an advisory award on whether the persons 
involved in the arrangement are employees. 
 
(4)  NEDLAC must prepare and issue a Code of Good Practice that sets out 
guidelines for determining whether persons, including those who earn in excess 
of the amount determined in subsection (2) are employees.” 
 
This means that a person is presumed to be an employee regardless of the form of 
contract if any one of the factors listed above is present in the relationship between 
that person and the person for whom they work for or to whom they render services 
to.  The person must earn under the threshold which is currently R205 433 per 
annum.  
  
In Ganga / Grassroots Entrepreneurial Development (Pty) Ltd t/a Grassroots Scape 
Facilities24 the arbitrator stated: 
 
“In legal terms, a presumption is the acceptance of a fact or state of affairs as being 
true and correct. There are two types of presumption, a rebuttable presumption and an 
irrebuttable presumption. A rebuttable presumption means that the fact or state of 
affairs is presumed to be true and correct until it can be proved otherwise, whereas an 
irrebuttable presumption is a fact or state of affairs that cannot be disproved.” 
 
These factors are not however requirements for being an employee.  They merely 
create a rebuttable presumption that a person is an employee.  In other words once 
these factors are met, the onus shifts to the respondent to prove on a balance of 
                                                     
24  [2010] 6 BALR 644 (CCMA). 
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probability that the applicant is an independent contractor and not an employee in 
terms of the definition set out in section 213 of the LRA. 
 
2.3 THE DOMINANT IMPRESSION TEST 
 
The dominant impression test or multiple test is often used by courts to establish 
whether the person seeking relief is in actual fact an employee and also to determine 
whether the nature of the employment relationship is that of a contract of 
employment or not.  The test requires the arbitrator or the court to arrive at a decision 
on the balance of probabilities on whether the facts indicate an independent 
contractor arrangement or the facts that indicate an employment contract 
relationship.  
 
The factors that the court would consider when using the dominant impression would 
include but not limited to the following:25 
 
 The control and supervision of the person’s work outputs, that is whether the 
employer has the right to discipline the worker or not.26 
 
 The extent to which the worker depends on the employer for the performance of 
his duties. 
 
 Whether the worker is allowed to work for another person. Usually employees 
are not allowed to work for more than one person whilst independent 
contractors on the other hand are free to render their services to other persons. 
In Ganga27 there was no evidence led to suggest that the person actually 
rendered his services to another person while he was working for the 
respondent.  This fact contributed in concluding that the person was an 
employee. 
 
                                                     
25  Basson et al Essential Labour Law 30. 
26  LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Mandla [2001] 9 BLLR 993 (LAC). 
27  Supra. 
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 Whether the worker is required to perform the work personally.  Employees are 
usually required to perform the work personally whilst independent contractors 
do not have to personally do the work, the requirement is that the work must be 
done. 
 
 Whether the worker is paid according to a fixed rate or by commission  
 
 Whether the worker provides his or her own tools and equipment. 
 
In SABC v McKenzie28 the Labour Appeal Court made a distinction between the 
contract of employment and the contract of work.  It ruled that in a contract of 
employment, an employee makes his services available to the employer irrespective 
of whether there is work to be done or not, therefore placing his productive capacity 
at the disposal of the employer.  On the other hand, an independent contractor 
commits himself only to deliver a product or end result of that capacity. It also held 
that in a contract of employment the employee puts his or services at the “beck and 
call” of the employer.  Services rendered are at the disposal of the employer, who 
may or may not decide to have them rendered.  The employee is subordinate to the 
will of the employer.  The employment contract terminates at death of employee or 
on expiration of period of service. 
 
In a contract of work relationship, there is an independent contractor who is not 
obliged to perform work personally, unless specifically agreed upon.  The 
independent contractor is bound to produce in terms of the contract of work, not by 
order of the employer and to perform in terms of the contract of work, not by the 
orders of the employer.  The death of the contractor does not necessarily terminate 
the contract of work; it terminates upon completion of work. 
 
2.4 WHO IS AN EMPLOYER? 
 
Generally, the parties to an employment relationship include employers and 
employees.  This may seem relatively straightforward but in certain cases it is not 
                                                     
28  [1999] ILJ 585 (LAC). 
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easy to identify the true nature of the parties involved as well as the nature of the 
relationship.  For instance in the context of Temporary Employment Services 
(hereinafter referred to as “the TES”) where there are three parties involved, the 
client, the labour broker and the employee it is not always easy to identify who the 
employer is.  The challenge arises at the termination of the contract of employment 
where it has to be determined whether there has been a dismissal or not.  An 
employee may allege that a client of the labour broker is the employer whilst the true 
employer could indeed be the labour broker.  
 
In Mandla v LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd,29 the court held that the effect of section 198(2)30 
of the LRA is to create a unique tripartite relationship and by designating the TES, 
rather than the client, as the employer. 
 
The LAC31 held that for the purposes of the LRA and the BCEA, it matters not that 
the client would, under the ordinary tests, be the employer of the person who renders 
a service.  By operation of law, for the purposes of those two statutes, the TES is 
deemed to be the employer in circumstances when it would otherwise not be.  It 
further held that the supervision and control test was not in itself sufficient to create 
an employment relationship between the parties. 
 
2.5 DISGUISED RELATIONSHIPS 
 
In some instances, for variety of reasons parties may specifically elect to avoid 
employment contract agreements and enter into an independent contracting 
relationship.  However, the fact that a person may be labelled or label himself as an 
independent contractor does not mean that the courts will not deem him or her to be 
an employee if the reality of the relationship dictates so.  The fact that a person 
provides services through the vehicle of a legal entity such as a company or a closed 
                                                     
29  (2002) 21 ILJ 1807 (LC). 
30  For the purposes of this Act, a person whose services have been procured for or provided to a 
client by a temporary employment service is the employee of that temporary employment 
service, and the temporary employment service is that person's employer. 
31  LAD Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Mandla supra. 
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corporation does not prevent the relationship being an employment relationship 
covered by labour legislation.  
 
In Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber32 the worker, Ms Gerber argued that she was dismissed 
by Denel, whilst Denel argued that she was not its employee but was an employee of 
her own company which had an agreement to provide certain services to Denel.  The 
LAC was required to determine whether there was in fact a dismissal and also to rule 
on the true nature of the employment relationship.  It held that such determination 
should not be solely made on the basis of what the parties have said in the 
agreement.  It said33 that the question must be decided on the basis of realities, on 
the basis of substance and not form or labels.  Whatever is said in their agreement 
may have been convenient to both parties at the time and the agreement may not 
reflect the true nature of the employment relationship. 
 
It further said that: 
 
“Any oral or other evidence which may assist the court to conclude what the reality of 
the relationship is or was between such two persons is admissible and is not precluded 
by the parol evidence rule. In this regard it is noteworthy that in almost all reported 
cases that I have come across which relate to this question, oral evidence was led 
which related to how parties interacted with each other and how they handled their 
relationship.” 
 
The court ruled that Ms Gerber was in reality the employee of Denel and further held 
that regard should be given to realities of the relationship and not labels in other 
words substance and not form.   
 
2.6 CODE OF GOOD PRACTICE:  WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE?  
 
The Code commences by setting out various guidelines, the main intention being to 
promote clarity and certainty as to who is an employee for the purposes of the LRA 
and other labour legislation. 
 
                                                     
32  [2005] 9 BLLR 849 (LAC). 
33  At par 22. 
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Another purpose of this code is to ensure that a proper distinction is maintained 
between the employment relationship which is regulated by labour legislation, and 
independent contracting. It spells out quite clearly that an employment relationship 
and an independent contractor relationship are totally different.  A further purpose is 
to ensure that employees who are in an unequal bargaining position in relation to the 
employer are protected through labour law and are not deprived of those protections 
by contracting arrangements. 
 
This indicates strongly that the legislature is aware that there are employers who may 
hide the true nature of the employment relationship in the disguise of a cleverly 
worded contract, thus depriving the employee of his legal right to fair treatment. 
  
The code further acknowledges that there exists a variety of employment 
relationships in the labour market, including disguised employment, ambiguous 
employment relationships, non-standard employment, and triangular employment 
relationships.  It  requires that any person who is interpreting or applying any of the 
following Acts, must take this code into account for the purpose of determining 
whether a particular person is an employee, in terms of the LRA; the BCEA; the EEA 
or the SDA. 
 
It seems the drafters of the code anticipated the issue of employers who might 
disguise the real nature of the employment relationship and show it as an 
independent contractor arrangement and states clearly in paragraph 16 that “a 
statement in a contract that the applicant is not an employee or is an independent 
contractor must not be taken as conclusive proof of the status of the applicant”.  The 
code states further that “The fact that an applicant satisfies the requirements of the 
presumption by establishing that one of the listed factors is present in the relationship 
does not establish that the applicant is an employee”.  However, the onus then falls 
on the “employer” to lead evidence to prove that the applicant is not an employee 
and that the relationship is in fact one of independent contracting. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESIGNATION 
 
An employee may terminate an employment contract by resigning.  Resignation can 
be defined as an employee’s notice of termination of the employment contract.  It is a 
unilateral decision by an employee to terminate the employment contract and does 
not require an employer’s acceptance nor can an employer refuse to accept a 
resignation. If a resignation can only be effective or valid only once accepted by an 
employer, in effect that would mean an employer would force an employee to remain 
in its employ against his or her will.  An employer cannot physically force an 
employee that has resigned to work, that employer has no choice but to accept the 
resignation.  In modern employment is not clear as to what an employer would 
achieve by forcing an employee to remain in its employ.  The employee would simply 
commit misconduct to avoid working for that employer. 
 
In practice though, many employers “accept” resignation however, this practice has 
no legal effect since a resignation is a unilateral act.  This principle was confirmed in 
Mafika v SA Broadcasting Corporation.34 
 
In SABC V CCMA35 the LC held that a resignation brings about an end of an 
employment relationship without the employer having to do any act and an 
employer's acceptance of the resignation is of no juridical significance. 
 
An employee that has tendered a resignation cannot withdraw the resignation, unless 
there is mutual agreement between employer and employee to accept the 
withdrawal, the employer is not obliged to accept the withdrawal.36  Due to the fact 
that resignation is a unilateral action by an employee, even if an employer has 
accepted a resignation, withdrawal of the acceptance of the resignation will have no 
legal effect.37 
                                                     
34  [2010] 5 BLLR 542 (LC). 
35  (2001) 22 ILJ 487 (LC) [11]. 
36  Du Toit v Sasko (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 ILJ 1253 (LC).  
37  De Villiers v Premier, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and Another [2011] 12 BLLR 1187 
(LC). 
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In the event that the resignation is tendered during the heat of an argument, the 
courts have held that refusal by the employer to accept the withdrawal may constitute 
a dismissal.38  Subsequent decisions about whether an employee is entitled to 
withdraw a resignation do not support this view.  In Mafika v SA Broadcasting 
Corporation39 the court held that however noble the motives of the employee may be, 
in law it cannot serve as a basis for withdrawal of the termination since in the first 
place the resignation is a voluntary and deliberate action of the employee. 
 
In SACWU obo Sithole / Afrox Gas Equipment Factory (Pty) Ltd40 an employee had 
resigned and withdrew his resignation two weeks later.  When the employer advised 
the employee that he had no right to do so, the employee contended that since the 
employer had not accepted the resignation and there were no discussions about the 
resignation he was entitled to withdraw the resignation.  As stated previously it was 
confirmed that there is no requirement in law for an employer to accept the 
resignation or discuss it with the employee for it to be valid. 
 
In Meyer v Provincial Department of Health & Welfare & others41 an employee facing 
disciplinary charges resigned, the employer accepted the resignation “without 
prejudice” but later changed its mind and required the resigned employee to attend a 
disciplinary hearing.  The LAC confirmed the principle that resignation is unequivocal 
and the employer’s acceptance of the resignation without prejudice does not entitle 
the employer to withdraw the acceptance since the resignation does not need to be 
accepted.  If the principle is that a resignation must be clear and unambiguous, an 
employer’s acceptance of resignation must also be clear and without conditions. 
 
An employee that has tendered a resignation cannot change his mind and withdraw 
the resignation unless the employer agrees to the withdrawal.  The decision to accept 
the withdrawal is solely that of the employer.  This means that an employer is free to 
                                                     
38  CEPPWAWU v Glass Aluminium [2000] CC 8 ILJ 695 (LAC). 
39  Supra. 
40  [2006] 6 BALR 592 (MEIBC).  
41  (2006) 27 ILJ 759 (LAC).  
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accept a withdrawal of a resignation from an employee that it wishes to keep in its 
employ and reject a withdrawal from an employee it does not wish to employ.  
 
3.1 RESIGNATION GIVEN BUT NOT READ BY THE EMPLOYER 
 
In African National Congress v Municipal Manager, George Local Municipality and 
Others42 the SCA had to deal with the question of whether a resignation delivered by 
a municipal councillor, Mr Jones to the municipal manager, Mr Africa but 
subsequently withdrawn and returned unread constitutes a valid resignation under 
Section 27 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998.  
 
Mr Jones delivered a resignation letter to the municipal manager in a sealed 
envelope and left it on his desk. Mr Africa did not read the letter immediately due to 
the fact that he had to attend to other pressing municipal business matters. The 
following day Mr Africa was informed via telephone by another councillor that Mr 
Jones had changed his mind about resigning and shortly after the telephone call, Mr 
Jones indeed came to fetch his resignation letter. Mr Africa gave it back to Mr Jones 
still in a sealed envelope and unread.  
 
The court was required to determine whether Mr Jones had in fact resigned and if so 
whether the municipal manager, the person authorised to receive the resignation 
letter, was advised of such resignation. 
 
The appellant contended that in terms of section 27(a) of the Act, Mr Jones’s seat 
became vacant as a matter of law once his resignation letter was delivered to the 
municipal manager who was in any event aware of the letter’s content. It was argued 
that to deny a resignation by reason of municipal manager’s failure to read the 
resignation letter whether deliberately or negligently would jeopardise certainty of 
practice in municipalities. 
 
The SCA held that whilst a resignation is a unilateral act, it must be unequivocally 
communicated to the intended recipient in order to be effective, unless there is a 
                                                     
42  [2010] 3 BLLR 221 (SCA). 
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contrary stipulation.43 In this case since the resignation letter was not opened nor 
read by the intended recipient, in fact there was no communication between the 
parties.   
 
The court held that mere delivery of the resignation letter was not sufficient. It is clear 
that Mr Jones had intentions to resign but on whether Mr Africa was advised, the 
court held that the party cancelling the resignation must convey his decision to the 
mind of the other party in order to bring the cancellation into effect.44  This could only 
be done if Mr Africa had read the resignation letter, the fact that he may have been 
told about the resignation is irrelevant, the court held.45  
 
The court held that it was imperative for the municipal manager to read the letter for 
resignation to come into effect.46  It further held that there was no indication 
whatsoever that the municipal manager deliberately refused to read the letter or that 
he was negligent in failing to read the letter. 
 
In conclusion, a resignation would only be effectively communicated to the employer 
once it is read by the employer.   
 
3.2 NOTICE OF TERMINATION 
 
The resignation can be with or without notice.  The BCEA47 stipulates the minimum 
notice period required in resignations as: 
 
 one week if the employee has been employed for less than 6 months; 
 two weeks if more than six months but less than 12 months; and 
 four weeks if more than 12 months. 
 
                                                     
43  [2010] 3 BLLR 221 (SCA) [11]. 
44  [2010] 3 BLLR 221 (SCA) [15]. 
45  [2010] 3 BLLR 221 (SCA) [16]. 
46  [2010] 3 BLLR 221 (SCA) [16]. 
47  Act 75 of 1997. 
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Despite the provisions of the BCEA an employer and employee may agree in writing 
to reduce or have longer notice period. Longer periods are mostly common in 
resignations of senior managers and employees with scarce skills. The requirement 
to give longer notice periods is applicable to both employers and employees. If an 
employee is required to give three months’ notice the employer is also required to 
give the same notice period. In some cases this could have dire effects for one party, 
for example an employer may require a senior manager to work out the three 
months’ notice whilst busy gathering the company trade secrets or the employer may 
be forced to pay an employee found guilty of dishonest misconduct.48  
 
The BCEA does not apply to employees working less than 24 hours a month. The 
question therefore is whether or not an employer is obliged to give notice period to 
this group of employees. One of the requirements of Schedule 8 of the Code of Good 
Practice of the LRA49 is that termination of employment must be procedurally fair. In 
the event that an employer would just inform an employee not bother to come to work 
the following day would be in line with this requirement. 
 
3.3 TERMINATION BY EMPLOYEE WITHOUT GIVING RELEVANT NOTICE 
 
It sometimes happens that employees resign without giving the required notice or 
give shorter notice. One of the employer’s recourse is to sue the employee for 
damages or hold the employee accountable to what is left of the contract. This may 
not be an easy task as the process would include a civil claim which might not 
necessarily be at the employer’s best interest especially for low earning employees. 
For this reason it is questionable as to whether the notice period stipulated in the 
contract of employment is worth the paper it’s written on. 
 
In NEWU v CCMA & others50 after an employee failed to give the required three 
months’ notice period in terms of the employment contract, the employer, a trade 
union referred an unfair labour practice dispute to the CCMA.  The CCMA held that it 
                                                     
48  Jacobs “Goodbye: A prescription for terminating employment” Pharmaceutical Practitioner. 
49  Act 66 of 1995. 
50  Case number JR/685/02 (LC). 
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lacked jurisdiction to deal with the matter as it did not amount to unfair labour practice 
in terms of the LRA.51  
 
NEWU took the decision of the CCMA to the LC seeking an order declaring that the 
LRA52 and the EEA53 infringe NEWU’s and other employers’ constitutional rights and 
are invalid or at least partially so.  The LC confirmed NEWU’s view that, the failure of 
the employee to give the required notice infringes employer’s rights to equality, equal 
protection and benefit of these laws and their right to have a dispute about the 
fairness of the resignation of an employee from service resolved by the application of 
law in a fair public hearing before the CCMA, Labour Court or another independent 
and impartial tribunal. 
 
The LC held that whist the definition of unfair labour practice in terms of the LRA 
specifically refers to the unfair conduct of the employer and not that of the employee, 
the conduct by the employee may qualify as an unfair labour practice, that is, a 
practice that is contrary to that contemplated by section 23 of the Constitution.54  A 
lawful resignation that is also in the circumstances unfair may constitute an unfair 
labour practice. A breach of the contract of employment, which is unfair to an 
employer, may give rise to an unfair labour practice. 
 
With regard to the recourse available to NEWU, the LC held that the employer did not 
need to rely on the broad, flexible, equity basis of an unfair labour practise as defined 
on the LRA. NEWU had a number of remedies available to it in order to address the 
consequences of the resignation of its employee including seeking an interdict in the 
form of a mandamus compelling then employee to adhere to the terms of the 
contract, suing the employee for three month’s salary in lieu of notice and also 
approaching a court of competent jurisdiction relying on section 23 of the 
Constitution55 to grant the relief which it seeks.   
 
                                                     
51  Act 66 of 1995. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Act 55 of 1998. 
54  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
55  S 23 provides that “Everyone has a right to fair labour practices”. 
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NEWU then approached the LAC56 appealing the decision of the LC.  The LAC held 
that the LRA57 makes no provision for the right of an employer not to have the 
contract of employment terminated unfairly by an employee.  It does not provide an 
employer with any recourse in a situation where an employee resigns or terminates 
the employment contract without giving the proper notice. 
 
The court reasoned that perhaps the legislator had purposely omitted to make this 
provision simply because doing so would have been a step backward in the field of 
labour relations and employment law since employers already enjoy more economic 
power compared to employees.58  If employers would be given such protection 
against employees, the power between employer and employee would become more 
imbalanced due to already existing unequal nature of the parties in an employment 
relationship.  It held that where the employee had resigned without giving notice in 
circumstances where he was obliged to give notice, the employer has a right to sue 
the employees for damages equivalent of the notice pay at common law and in terms 
of the provisions of the BCEA. 
 
Employers hardly use this right. Under the old Labour Relations Act59 employers had 
a right to bring unfair labour practice claims against employees for virtually any 
conduct on the part of employees including termination of a contract of employment 
occasioned by the resignation of an employee however, even then one can hardly 
find a case brought to the Industrial Court by an employer against an employee 
complaining that the employee’s resignation constituted an unfair labour practice.  
The fact that employers had a right to bring such claims but hardly ever brought them 
suggests that there was no need to include such a right in the current LRA.60 
 
The LAC61 further held that generally, employers do not need protection against 
unfair resignations from employees.  They are sufficiently powerful when compared 
                                                     
56  Case no JA51/03 (LAC). 
57  S 186. 
58  Case no JA51/03 (LAC)[22]. 
59  Act 28 of 1956. 
60  Act 66 of 1995. 
61  At par [20]. 
20 
with individual workers acting individually and are able to deal with unfair resignations 
adequately without a statutory right not to be subjected to unfair resignations.    
 
This assertion by the LAC is in line with ILO Convention 158 on Termination of 
Employment which provides no protection for employers against unfair or unjustified 
resignations but provides protection of employees against unjustified dismissals. 
 
In SA Music Rights Organisation v Mphatsoe62 the LC held that circumstances in 
which an employer would seek to recover damages from an employee for a breach 
by the employee of the employment contract must be extremely limited, although in 
principle an employer is entitled to recover any loss that it suffers consequent on 
such breach.63  The court held that it is not sufficient for an employer to base its 
calculation of damages merely on remuneration and benefits that the employee 
would have earned; it held that when claiming damages an employer must be able to 
establish any loss consequent on the respondent’s breach of contract.64 
 
3.4 MUST THE NOTICE OF TERMINATION BE IN WRITING? 
 
The BCEA65 requires that the notice of termination of an employment contract must 
be in writing except when given by an illiterate employee.  The next question is 
whether it is obligatory for a resignation to be in writing.  Common law does not 
require the notice of termination to be in writing.  In Quinn/Singlehurst Hydraulics 
(SA) Ltd66 it was stated that the test as to whether an employee resigned or not is 
that an employee has to show by “word or conduct” a clear and unambiguous 
intention not to continue with the contract of employment and lead a reasonable 
person to believe so.  The word “conduct” implies that it does not have to be in 
writing. Since the employment contract does not have to be reduced to writing, it can 
safely be said that a resignation does not have to be in writing. 
 
                                                     
62  [2009] 7 BLLR 696 (LC).  
63  At par [15]. 
64  At par [19]. 
65  S 37(4)(a). 
66  [2005] 6 BALR 673 (CCMA). 
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However, a distinction between a resignation and an intention to resign must be 
made as discussed in African National Congress v Municipal Manager, George Local 
Municipality and Others67 above.  Employers are cautioned not to be hasty and 
interpret an intention to resign as “resignation”; because an “intention” to resign does 
not constitute a resignation. This supports the principle that resignation must be 
clear, unambiguous and there must be no conditions attached to it. 
 
In Mafika v SA Broadcasting Corporation Ltd68 an employee had terminated an 
employment contract with immediate effect via SMS (short message system) and 
later changed his mind and claimed that an SMS does not constitute notice in writing. 
The court was required to decide whether notice via SMS constitutes notice in 
writing. The court held that termination via an SMS constitutes notice in writing.69  
The court based its decision on Electronic Communications and Transactions Act70 
which provides that a requirement in law that a document must be in writing is met if 
the document is in the form of a data message, it held that an SMS is a data 
message and qualifies as a notice in writing. 
  
                                                     
67  [2010] 3 BLLR 221 (SCA). 
68  [2010] 5 BLLR 542 (LC). 
69   Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife [2008] 10 BLLR 954 (LC) 548G-I. 
70  S 12, Act 25 of 2002. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DEATH 
 
The death of either party in an employment contract may terminate the contract.  In 
the event of the death of an employee, the employment contract terminates.  
 
4.1 DEATH OF AN EMPLOYEE  
 
When an employee dies, performance of the employee’s obligation in terms of the 
contract is prevented by a superior force of nature that could not reasonably have 
been guarded against.71  It is not possible to continue with the terms of the contract, 
meaning that supervening impossibility of performance has occurred. 
 
“Death in service” is the term used where an employee dies while working or still in 
service with the employer.  The employee’s death could be as a result of an injury or 
an occupational disease that arises out of and in the course of employment or it may 
have nothing to do with the employment relationship. 
 
At common law, in the event that an employee dies in service or contracts an 
occupational injury or disease through the employer’s negligence, the employee or 
his dependant has to institute a delictual action against the employer for 
compensation.  A delict is an act that is wrongful and unlawful that causes damage, 
where there is also a link between the damage and the act.  
 
Dependants of deceased employees are however at liberty to make a claim against 
third parties other than their employer for example, colleagues.  They can still hold 
the employer accountable from the perspective of criminal liability. 
 
  
                                                     
71  Brassey “The Effect of Supervening Impossibility of Performance on Contract of Employment” 
1990 Acta Juridica 22 23. 
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4.2 DEATH OF AN EMPLOYER 
 
The death of an employer does not necessarily end the employment contract.  Where 
the employer is a juristic person, the death of its members even a sole member does 
not affect the existence of the contract between the company and its employees.72 
Employees may claim for notice pay against the deceased estates of their 
employers.  
 
In the event of the death of the employer, a juristic person, the death of its members, 
even of a sole member does not affect the existence of the contract between the 
company or closed corporation and its employees.  Companies must be formally 
wound up in order to terminate contractual ties with their employees.  Contractual 
rights and duties are generally transmissible on death of an employer and the 
resolution of the contract is left to the executor of the deceased's estate. 
  
                                                     
72  Grogan Workplace Law 84. 
24 
CHAPTER 5 
DESERTION 
 
In terms of the employment contract, the primary and fundamental duty of an 
employee is to render services and skills to his employer at the agreed time and 
place.  The employer has a commensurate right to expect him to do so within the 
administrative arrangements of the contract such as determining the rules and 
standards for the work that is to be done. 
 
The employee must make available his services and remain in service in terms of the 
contract.  A basic element of this duty is that an employee is expected to be at his 
workplace during working hours, unless he has an adequate reason to be absent.73 
In the event an employee fails to render his services to the employer he then must 
provide an employer with a satisfactory reason or explanation for his absence.74 
Wilful absence from work constitutes a breach in contract and is therefore a 
disciplinable offence. 
 
In South African labour law a distinction is drawn between, absenteeism, 
abscondment and desertion.   
 
Desertion occurs when an employee abandons his or her work with no intention of 
returning,75 in other words the employee intends to terminate the employment 
relationship.  Desertion is deemed to have taken place when evidence warrants the 
conclusion that the employee has formed a clear and unequivocal intention to 
abandon his or her employment.76  The employee may indicate such intention to 
abandon work expressly or by implication. 
 
                                                     
73  Grogan Dismissal, Discrimination & Unfair Labour Practices [2005] 237. 
74  Metal and Allied workers Union v Horizon Engineering (Pty) Ltd (1989) 10 ILJ 782 (Arb). 
75  Khulani Fidelity Services Group v CCMA [2009] 8 BLLR 767 (LC) 20; SABC v CCMA [2002] 8 
BLLR 693 (LAC). 
76  Grogan Workplace Law 186; SACWU v Dyasi [2001] 7 BLLR 731 (LAC) 19; Ngindana & others 
v Grahamstown Municipality [1994] 11 BLLR 68 (IC). 
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In Ngindana & others v Grahamstown Municipality77 a group of employees engaged 
in essential services had been absent from work without leave after their leave 
request was declined.  The employees proceeded and went on leave even though 
the leave was not approved.  Subsequent to that, the employer terminated their 
services on the fourth day of their absence.  
 
The employer first contended that the employees’ conduct amounted to a repudiation 
of their contract of employment and therefore entitled the employer to cancel the 
contract on the grounds of repudiation.  Secondly, the employer contented that since 
there was no dismissal, there was no need for an enquiry prior to terminating 
services.  
 
With regard to the issue of repudiation, the Industrial Court held that repudiation 
occurs when whether by word or conduct, an employee evinces a clear and 
unequivocal intention not to perform the obligation due under the contract.78  It further 
held that the test whether an intention is sufficiently evinced by conduct is whether 
the party renunciating has acted in such a way as to lead a reasonable person to the 
conclusion that he does not intend to fulfil his part of the contract.  The court said, 
even if it could be said that the applicants had taken leave without authorisation, they 
did not repudiate their contracts as they had intended to carry on with their 
employment after they had taken leave.  They had not evinced a clear and 
unequivocal intention not to return to work. 
 
The court went on and held that an important distinction was to be drawn between 
repudiation and a breach of the contract, as the latter amounted to misconduct.  It 
was held that their conduct amounted to a breach of contract, which is a form of 
misconduct, in respect of which an enquiry was required prior to their dismissal in 
terms of the LRA.  Since the employer did not hold an enquiry before terminating the 
services, the dismissal was found to have been procedurally unfair.  
 
                                                     
77  [1994] 11 BLLR 68 (IC). 
78  Ngindana & others v Grahamstown Municipality supra 74. 
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There is a clear distinction between desertion, abscondment and unauthorized 
absence from work, this distinction can be can be established by the employee’s 
conduct. The distinction will be discussed further below. 
 
5.1  DISTINCTION BETWEEN DESERTION AND ABSCONDMENT  
5.1.1  ABSCONDMENT 
 
Abscondment refers to a situation where an employee has been absent from work for 
periods that warrant an inference that the employee does not intend to return to 
work.79 
 
Whether an employee has absconded or not is determined by the actual period the 
employee has been absent and the nature of communication the employer has had 
with the employee during this period of absence. 
 
The period of absence as well as the total lack of communication by the employee of 
his or whereabouts leads the employer to believe that the employee is not going to 
return.  In other words the employer draws the inference from these facts that the 
employee does not have the intention of returning to work.  It is important to note 
that, it is still an inference that is drawn, and is not confirmed by the employee.  
 
The difference between desertion and abscondment is that in abscondment cases, 
an inference is made that the employee has no intention to return to work whilst a 
deserting employee expressly or by implication intimates that he or she has no 
intention to return to work.80 
 
5.1.2  DISTINCTION BETWEEN UNAUTHORISED ABSENCE FROM WORK 
AND DESERTION 
Unauthorized absence from work means an employee that is scheduled to work is 
absent from work but still intends to return to work.  Absenteeism can take various 
                                                     
79  Grogan Dismissal 177. 
80  Ngindana & others v Grahamstown Municipality supra. 
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forms for example late coming, taking extended lunch breaks and being absent 
without leave. 
 
In SABC v CCMA & Others81 the Labour Appeal Court drew a distinction between 
desertion and absence without permission.  It held that the test to differentiate 
between absence without leave and desertion is whether the employee has an 
intention not to return to work or not.  A sequence of events that led to the LAC 
decision will be discussed below. 
 
In South African Broadcasting Corporation v CCMA82 an employee’s employment 
contract was terminated by the employer after the employee had failed to comply 
with verbal and written instructions to report for duty.  Subsequent to the employee’s 
failure to report for duty, the employer notified the employee in writing that his 
employment contract had been terminated.  The employee referred the matter to the 
CCMA which found that the employee had been dismissed, and that his dismissal 
was substantively fair but procedurally unfair.  The employer then instituted 
proceedings in the Labour Court for the review and setting aside of that award. 
 
The employer challenged the CCMA decision insofar as the conclusion that a 
dismissal occurred at all. SABC contended that there was no dismissal, the 
employee had deserted and therefore, the act of desertion on the part of an 
employee is the juridical event which terminates the employment relationship. 
Employer also argued that it was not necessary to afford an employee who 
“deserted” a hearing because no “dismissal”. 
 
It further contended that if a dismissal did occur, that the employer was in the 
circumstances excused from affording the employee a hearing, in which regard 
reliance was placed on paragraph 4 of the Code of Good Practice in relation to 
dismissals, contained in Schedule 8 of the LRA, which states in relation to fair 
procedure, that:  
 
                                                     
81  [2002] 8 BLLR 693 (LAC). 
82  (2001) 22 ILJ 487 (LC) 13. 
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“In exceptional circumstances, if the employer cannot reasonably be expected to 
comply with these guidelines, the employer may dispense with pre-dismissal 
procedures.” 
 
The Labour83 Court held that, mere absence from work is no indication that the 
employee has abandoned his work and has no intention of returning back.  It held 
that the employer should establish whether the employee has communicated an 
unequivocal intention not to return to work or not, if the answer is yes then, the fact of 
desertion is established.84  If the answer is no, then it means the employee is merely 
absent and has not deserted.  
 
The LC upheld the CCMA finding that the employee had been dismissed since the 
act of desertion by an employee constitutes a repudiation of the employment 
contract, it is not the act of desertion which terminates the contract of employment, 
but the act of the employer who elects to exercise its right to terminate the contract in 
the face of that breach.85   
 
With regard to desertion being a unilateral act like in resignation, the court held that 
even though a unilateral decision by an employee is not an act which is permitted by 
the terms of the contract and because desertion is not permitted by the terms of the 
contract, it constitutes a breach, resignation on the other hand is permitted and is not 
a breach. 
 
Concerning whether the employee was entitled to a hearing or not, it was held that 
since the act of the employee was a breach and thus constituted misconduct, the 
employer should have held a disciplinary hearing since the whereabouts of the 
employee were known.  The findings of the court are in line with the findings and 
decision of the Industrial Court in Ngindana & others v Grahamstown Municipality.86 
 
It further held that the employer cannot be expected to hold a disciplinary enquiry in 
exceptional circumstances where an employee’s whereabouts are not known. 
                                                     
83  Supra. 
84  At 12. 
85  At par 17. 
86  [1994] 11 BLLR 68 (IC). 
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Therefore, the employer’s reliance on Clause (4)4 of the Code of Good Practice was 
misplaced, these were not exceptional circumstances. 
 
The employer took the matter to the LAC87 on appeal.  The LAC held that a 
deliberate and unequivocal intention no longer to be bound by the contract of 
employment was never established, further to that, the employee was hoping that a 
disciplinary enquiry would be convened against him so that he could state his case.88 
It therefore could not be said that the employee had deserted. 
 
The LAC also held that it cannot be deduced merely from the employee’s failure to 
report for duty that he had deserted his post.89  It concluded that the employee’s 
failure to report for work did not amount to desertion.  Since the employee did not 
desert, he had committed misconduct by failing to heed to the employer’s call to 
return to work.  It goes without saying that he was therefore entitled to a disciplinary 
enquiry prior to termination of his services to give effect to the audi alteram partem 
rule, the court held. 
 
In Seabolo v Belgravia Hotel90 an employee who worked as a barman for the 
respondent informed his employer that his mother was ill in Rustenburg, and that he 
was going to visit her.  The employer agreed to give him one day’s leave.  However, 
the employee returned to work some six days later without informing the employer. 
On his return, he was informed that he had been dismissed and another person 
employed in his job. 
 
The arbitrator was required firstly to establish whether the employee had deserted or 
abandoned his employment considering that the employer knew the circumstances 
and the whereabouts of the employee.  Secondly, to consider whether the employee 
had been unfairly dismissed, taking into account that there was no disciplinary 
enquiry, and whether the reason for the dismissal was a fair reason. 
 
                                                     
87  SABC v CCMA [2002] 8 BLLR 693 (LAC). 
88  SABC v CCMA supra 13. 
89  Ibid. 
90  [1997] 6 BLLR 829 (CCMA), case number GA 1288. 
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The arbitrator found that no evidence emerged at the arbitration to indicate that the 
employee had no intention of returning to work the following day, as arranged with 
the employer since normally “the intention not to return to work” is one of the 
essential elements in concluding that a desertion has taken place as indicated in 
other judgements.91  He held that the employer had acted prematurely in assuming a 
desertion.  The arbitrator held that the employer could have enquired as to the 
whereabouts of the employee before drawing an inference that the employee has no 
intention of returning to work.  
 
This contention is supported by the LC in SABC v CCMA92  where it said: 
 
“the self-evident paradox in this decision is explained in terms of the rather more 
obvious question which every employer must ask in the face of the absence of an 
employee: why? In those instances where the employee communicates an unequivocal 
intention not to return to work, the fact of desertion is established”. 
 
The arbitrator’s view is also supported by Dekker,93 where he states that if the 
employee cannot be contacted, there seem to be three things that the employer must 
do to show that he has acted reasonably.  
 
 First, he should show that he has made every effort to contact the employee 
before he is dismissed.94  Whilst most deserters do not inform their employer 
that they are abandoning their job, the employer should make enquiries into the 
reasons for the absence, they could do this by for example asking colleagues, 
send telegrams to the employee’s address.  Employers need to warn and 
advise employees of possible consequences of not reporting for duty,95 instruct 
them to return to work and to confirm whether in actual fact the employee has 
deserted. 
 
                                                     
91  SABC v CCMA supra 13; Ngindana & others v Grahamstown Municipality supra. 
92  (2001) 22 ILJ 487 (LC) [11]. 
93  Dekker “Gone with the Wind and Not Giving A Damn: Problems and Solutions in Connection 
with Dismissal  Based on Desertion” 2010 22 SA Merc LJ 106 104–113. 
94  Mofokeng v KSB Pumps (2003) 24 ILJ 1756 (BCA); SABC v CCMA (2001) 22 ILJ 487 (LC) [11]. 
95  Ngindana & others v Grahamstown Municipality supra. The court held that the employer could 
have warned the employees in writing about the consequences of their actions when it became 
clear that they were determined to taking leave regardless of the employer’s instructions not to. 
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 Secondly, the employee should get an opportunity to be heard. This includes 
holding a disciplinary enquiry in absentia if the employee cannot be traced or 
does not heed to the employer’s instruction to return to work. In the event that 
the employee appears after a decision to dismiss has been taken, a rehearing 
will be necessary in order to give the employee an opportunity to be heard to 
determine whether there were justifiable reasons for absence. This was also 
confirmed in Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi.96  The key principle 
entails that employees should get an opportunity to be heard before their 
employment is terminated by the employer however burdensome or frivolous 
that may be for employers.97 
 
In SACWU v Dyasi98 the Court deviated slightly from this view, remarking that where 
the employee cannot be traced, the employer may have no other option but to accept 
the employee’s breach of contract. The effect would therefore be that the employee, 
not the employer, terminated the contract. Therefore, termination does not constitute 
a dismissal. In this case, the court held that the situation would be different in cases 
where the employee could be traced and reached however the employer still 
chooses to terminate employment, such termination would constitute dismissal. 
 
According to Dekker,99 this obiter remark by the court is not in line with the 
interpretation of dismissal in section 186 of the LRA.100  Dismissal means an 
employer terminates a contract of employment, although the employee apparently 
does not wish to continue with the contract of employment and indicates this through 
his or her own actions, it is still the employer who must take the initiative to end the 
contract of employment in a manner recognised by law. 
 
                                                     
96  [2010] (017/09) ZASCA 2 
97  Mabasa v JS Corporate Security (2011) 32 ILJ 1456. 
98  (2001) 7 BLLR 731 (LAC) 20.  
99  Dekker “Gone with the Wind and Not Giving A Damn: Problems and Solutions in Connection 
with Dismissal Based on Desertion” 2010 22 SA Merc LJ 106 104–113. 
100  Act 66 of 1995 “(a) an employer has terminated a contract of employment with or without 
notice”. 
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In SA Transport & Allied Workers Union obo Langa & others V Zebediela Brakes 
(Pty) Ltd101 a number of employees had been dismissed for participating in an 
unprotected strike.  The employer offered to re-instate them and they accepted, 
however none of them returned to work even though they were repeatedly requested 
to do so.  They referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA who for 
jurisdictional reasons referred to the dispute to the LC. 
 
The employer argued that the employees had deserted, that is they were not only 
absent but had no intention to return to work.  The court found that their absence and 
failure to respond to requests to return to work was serious enough to warrant 
dismissal.  However, it held that the employer should have charged them for absence 
without permission, held a disciplinary hearing prior to dismissal.  It held that the 
dismissal was procedurally unfair. 
 
Generally when repudiation occurs, the other party has an election to either accept 
the repudiation or hold the employee to the terms of the contract.  In SACWU v 
Dyasi102 the court held that the choice is not always in fact real.  An employer faced 
with desertion by employee who cannot be traced has no choice but to accept the 
repudiation.  
 
In cases of absenteeism, the employee has the onus to contact the employer at the 
first reasonable opportunity and offer the employer an explanation for his absence.  
Whilst the employee has a duty to contact the employer and notify him of his 
absence, conventional wisdom however also indicate that the employer should also 
try and contact the employee in order to confirm the inferences the employer is 
drawing from the employees absence and lack of communication.  This would avoid 
making negative inferences as evidenced in Seabolo v Belgravia Hotel.103  A 
telegram, or registered letter sent to the last known address of the employee notifying 
the employee to report for duty  or by a certain time to indicate whether he intends to 
return to work or not would suffice. 
                                                     
101  (2001) ILJ 428 (LC).  
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This is by no means obligatory for an employer and in so doing the employer does 
not have to mount a search for the employee.   
 
5.2 DEALING WITH INCARCERATED EMPLOYEES 
 
Incarcerated employees pose a challenge for employers.  In certain circumstances 
such cases are treated as some form of desertion whilst at times the termination of 
employment is treated as supervening impossibility of performance.  
 
In National Union of Metalworkers of SA on behalf of Magadla and AMT Services 
(Pty) Ltd104 an employee was absent for six weeks without an explanation, because 
he was held in custody.  Upon his release from custody he returned to work and the 
employer advised him that his contract had been terminated for desertion.  
 
The arbitrator held that the employer was only entitled to regard the employee as 
having repudiated his contract of employment, if it reached that conclusion after 
considering all the factors and after conducting its own enquiry to establish that he 
had indeed deserted his work and thus had no intention to return to work.  Upon his 
return the employee had provided a good reason for his absence. 
 
In Mofokeng v KSB Pumps105 the applicant was absent from work for three weeks as 
a result of being imprisoned.  After informing the respondent of his whereabouts, the 
respondent within two weeks of absence terminated his services based on 
operational requirements and uncertainty as to when the applicant would return to 
work.  In this case it could not be held that the employee deserted since his 
whereabouts were known to the employer.  Immediately after being released from 
prison, the applicant reported for duty only to be advised that his services had been 
terminated and a replacement had been found.  The dismissal was found to have 
been unfair in that there was no enquiry held prior to taking a decision to dismiss him. 
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In Samancor Tubatse Ferrochrome v Metal & Engineering Industries Bargaining 
Council106 the LAC was required to consider a LC decision where it was held that 
when an imprisoned employee is absent from work, he is not the cause of his 
incarceration, that is a factor beyond his control.  It could therefore not be said that 
he is absent without permission.107  The LAC held that the dismissal based on 
“operational incapacity” was substantively fair as the employer could not have been 
expected to keep the position of the employee open indefinitely.  However, it ruled 
that dismissal of incarcerated employees could fall under dismissal based on 
incapacity.  The court held that dismissal for incapacity should not be limited to 
incapacity due to ill health and poor performance.  It reasoned that incapacity can 
take other forms including imprisonment.108 
 
5.3 CONTRACT TERMS AND CODES OF CONDUCT  
 
As discussed above, the primary duty of an employee is to render a service to an 
employer in exchange for remuneration.  In the event that an employee fails to avail 
himself for rendering the service, he is in breach of the contract and thus not entitled 
to remuneration for the period not worked.  
 
Employers may through employer’s disciplinary procedure, disciplinary code, 
conditions of employment and sometimes individual employment contracts make 
provision that if employees have been absent from work for a period deemed by the 
employer, the period of absence amounts to desertion.  The number of days differs 
and usually ranges between five to fourteen days.  When the prescribed time expires, 
the employee will be deemed to have deserted.  In such cases the employer often 
claims that the employee has in fact dismissed himself or herself.  However, as 
discussed previously, it is the employer who takes the decision to terminate the 
employment contract thus dismissing the employee, it is highly unlikely that such 
disciplinary codes will stand the scrutiny of the courts unless agreed upon by the 
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trade unions, in such cases they become collective agreements which are binding to 
all parties. 
  
According to Grogan109 disciplinary codes normally treat absenteeism on a graduated 
scale when it comes to sanctions.  For a first offence an employee may be 
counselled or issued with a verbal warning, on the second occasion a written warning 
may be issued, on the third occasion a final written warning may be issued and finally 
an employee maybe dismissed however the employer is still required to prove the 
fairness of the dismissal. 
 
In SABC v CCMA110 it was held that the employer’ disciplinary procedure contained a 
clause which provided for a disciplinary hearing to be held in the event that the 
employee had been absent from work without permission more than five consecutive 
days.  However, in this case, the employer failed to comply with its own disciplinary 
procedure, instead of charging the employee and holding a disciplinary enquiry, it 
terminated his services and alleged that he had deserted.  The court held that 
according to the above clause from the disciplinary procedure, it was obligatory for 
the employer to hold a disciplinary enquiry in respect of the offence that the 
employee had committed. 
 
5.4  LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECTOR 
 
In the local government sector, absenteeism is dealt with in terms of a disciplinary 
procedure which is contained in a collective agreement between the South African 
Local Government Association (hereinafter referred to as “SALGA”, the Employer’s 
Organisation) and Independent Municipal and Allied Trade Union (hereinafter 
referred to as “IMATU”) and South African Municipal Workers’ Union (hereinafter 
referred to as “SAMWU”).  
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The code stipulates that in the event that the employee has absented himself for a 
period of more than ten days without notification to the employer, such employee 
shall be deemed to have absconded from duty. 
 
However, recognising the employer’s obligation to enquire about the employee’s 
whereabouts where an employee does not report for duty, the disciplinary code 
provides that the employer will endeavour to establish the employee’s whereabouts 
and also issue him or her with a letter informing about the alleged abscondment.  It 
also provides that in the event that the employee returns to work after ten days, he or 
she will be afforded an opportunity to make written representations prior to 
termination of employment. 
 
In Mopani District Municipality v SALG & others111 an employee was dismissed 
on grounds of desertion after he failed to report for duty in Tzaneen Fire Station 
subsequent to him being transferred to Giyani Fire Station based on section 
197 of the LRA.  The employee conditionally accepted the offer to transfer to 
Tzaneen subject to negotiations with the employer on relocation benefits and 
travelling cost.  As contained on the transfer agreement, the employee was 
entitled to negotiate with the employer on the two issues.  The employer failed 
to respond to the employee’s letter with regard to engaging in negotiations 
about the transfer.112 
 
On the day the employee was supposedly required to report for duty in Tzaneen, 
he reported for duty in Giyani. However, the employer dismissed him and alleged 
that he had deserted.  The LAC found his dismissal to be both substantively 
unfair and procedurally unfair in that there was no indication that the employee 
had abandoned his work as he still tendered his services in Tzaneen and the 
employer knew well that the employee was at Tzaneen and consequently knew 
about his whereabouts.113 
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With regard to procedural fairness, the court held that that very little notification 
was generated by the employer to the employee with regard to its decision to 
dismiss.  Only after the letter of dismissal was generated, were there some 
attempts to hold a disciplinary enquiry.  There can be no question that in this 
particular regard, procedural fairness had hardly been complied with in terms of 
which are required by the law.114 
 
The employee, having been dissatisfied with the decision of the LAC of twelve months 
compensation order, appealed to the SCA.115  The SCA held that the conduct of the 
LAC was inappropriate because the LAC had embarked on an investigation of the 
facts and had acted as if it was sitting as a tribunal of first instance as such 
misconceived its role.  It found that desertion could not be justified in this case 
because in the first place, the employee had tendered his services at the Tzaneen 
Fire Station and the employee knew well that the employee was at Tzaneen and 
consequently knew about his whereabouts.  The SCA also confirmed that 
consequent to the finding that the dismissal was substantively unfair  
 
5.5 DESERTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
Desertion in the public sector is governed by Public Services Act116 (hereinafter 
referred to as “PSA”) and Employment of Educators Act117 (hereinafter referred to as 
“EEA”).   
 
These statutes contain clauses which are commonly referred to as “deeming 
provisions”.  A deeming provision means that legislation or an employer’s code, 
procedure or conditions of employment provide that if an employee is absent from 
work for a certain number of days, the employee will be deemed to have deserted. 
 
Where a statute provides that an employee is deemed to have been dismissed after 
a certain period of unauthorised absence, absence beyond that period does not 
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constitute dismissal but constitute a termination by operation of law.118  The CCMA, 
bargaining councils or the Labour Court do not have jurisdiction to deal with such 
cases since there is no dismissal. 
 
5.6 EMPLOYMENT OF EDUCATORS ACT  
 
Employees in both public and in the private sector are both covered by the LRA. 
However, public sector employees are also covered by other legislation including the 
Employment of Educators Act.119  One of the reasons is that educators are affected 
by other aspects which apply to education and affects other parties namely, the 
learners.  Therefore, the approach of the civil courts and Labour Courts over the 
procedures to be followed when public sector employees absent themselves without 
leave may sometimes differ to the approach followed when dealing with private 
sector employees. 
 
As indicated above, Employment of Educators Act120 provides for a deeming 
provision which stipulates that educators absent from work for periods exceeding 
fourteen days are deemed to have been discharged from service on account of 
misconduct.  In such cases there is no dismissal as the termination is by operation of 
law.  The EEA provides for the termination of employment of contract by operation of 
                                                     
118  Nkopo v Public Health & Welfare Bargaining Council & Others (2002) 23 ILJ 520 (LC); Public 
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may determine.” 
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law and affords an employee who has been discharged by the deeming provision an 
opportunity to be heard if he or she wishes to be reinstated.121  
 
In Mogola v Head of Department of Education122 employees were discharged for 
being absent from work for more than fourteen days. It was held that discharge of an 
educator under section 14(1) of EEA does not constitute dismissal as defined in LRA 
but appeal in terms of section 17(2)123 subject to review.  The court also held that, an 
employer has to consider submissions made by an employee in terms of section 
14(2).  In this case an employer failed to consider the submissions made by the 
employee.  The discharge was set aside and employer was ordered to reinstate the 
employees.  
 
The court held that the state is obliged to consider submissions made by employees 
prior to making a decision to re-instate or not to re-instate, failure to do so would be 
against the principles of fairness and such a decision would be subject to review in 
terms of section 145 of the LRA.124  
 
In Phenithi v Minister of Education125 an employee challenged the constitutionality of 
the provisions on the EEA,126 namely sections 14(1) and 14(2) in terms of which her 
dismissal was effected.  She alleged that the provision offends her right to fair labour 
practice and lawful administrative action.  
 
The Act provides that the employer has a discretion whether to hold a hearing or not 
when an employee who has been absent from unexplained period request re-
instatement.  The employee had initially approached the High Court and sought an 
order to set aside her dismissal and declaring her dismissal unfair and 
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unconstitutional.  The High Court dismissed the application and held that the 
employer in electing not to re-instate her exercised a discretion vested in him terms 
of section 14(1) of EEA127 correctly, properly and fairly. 
 
The SCA relying on Minister van Onderwys en Kultuur v Louw 128 had the following to 
say about the right to be heard in the event that the deeming provision came into 
effect: 
 
“Should a person allege for example, that he had the necessary consent and that 
allegation is disputed, the factual dispute is justiciable by a court of law. There is then 
no question of a review of an administrative decision. Indeed, the coming into operation 
of the deeming provision is not dependent upon any decision. There is thus no room for 
reliance on the audi rule which, in its classic formulation, is applicable when an 
administrative and discretionary decision may detrimentally affect the rights, privileges 
or liberty of a person.” 
 
It further held that the discharge is not the result of a discretionary decision but 
merely a notification as a result of which occurred by operation of law.   
 
In dealing with the constitutionality issue, the court had to determine the following: 
 
 Whether the provision violates the fundamental right to fair labour practice in 
terms of section 23(1) of the Constitution because it allows the employer to act 
without considering the substantive and procedural aspects of the case before 
termination; and 
 
 whether the provision violates the fundamental right to administrative action that 
is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair in terms of section 33(1) of the 
Constitution in that it does not only fail to compel the employer to hear the other 
party but fails to compel the employer to give reasons for the decision. 
 
The court held that the decision is not taken by the employer, it is an operation of law 
namely interpretation of section 14(1) (a)129 and therefore there was no action by the 
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employer but an operation of law.  There was no unfairness created by the employer, 
the absence, according to the statute amounts to desertion.  
 
The court further held that an employer cannot be expected to give reasons other 
than the fact that termination of the employment contract was the consequence of the 
deeming provision that is the only plausible reason.  The court130 held that the 
employer cannot suspend the operation of the statute in order to afford an educator 
or employee an opportunity to be heard.  It ruled that this provision of the statute 
does not render it unconstitutional.131  
 
There are competing interests of which consideration of both is necessary.  The 
teacher’s right to be heard should be weighed against the learner’s right to learn, 
another constitutional imperative.  The court highlighted the following in justifying the 
deeming provision: 
 
 For 14 days the learners are left without a teacher;  
 
 the Department cannot appoint a substitute or a temporary educator 
immediately;  
 
 major disruptions are caused as a reshuffling of both educators and learners is 
required; the Department has to remunerate such educator while he/she is not 
fulfilling his/her obligations; and 
 
 the principal of the school concerned has a grave dilemma regarding what to do 
during the educator’s absence.  
 
The court further held that: 
 
“The reasons given by Ms Rossouw are confirmed by Mr Eben Boshoff, Director of 
Legal and Legislative Services, responsible for the drafting of education legislation, 
who adds that having a teacher in the classroom is an important aspect of giving 
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substance to a child’s right to education. Education, he continues, has the unique 
responsibility of balancing the rights of children with the competing rights of others, 
such as educators. Section 28 (2) of the Constitution states that a child’s best interests 
are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. The intention behind 
section 14 of the Act, he says, is to limit the potential harm that learners could suffer 
because of the absence of an educator without leave, while still allowing for a period of 
14 days before the right of the educator is affected by operation of law.” 
 
Section 14(2) still affords an educator an opportunity to be heard and to be reinstated 
on good cause shown.  
 
In the public sector the courts have held that coming into operation of the deeming 
provision is not dependent upon any decision by an employer.  The deemed 
dismissal provisions in the public sector will continue to withstand judicial scrutiny 
especially in the light of the SCA judgment where the court held that provisions of 
section 14(1)(a) and section 14(2) of the EEA are not unconstitutional.132 
 
5.7 PUBLIC SERVICES ACT 
 
The Public Services Act133 stipulates that if a public sector employee is absent from 
work without proper authorisation for more than one calendar month, that employee 
is deemed to have been dismissed due to misconduct.  The employer is required to 
reconsider the effect of the deeming provision.  The PSA also provides for the 
termination of employment of contract by operation of law and afford an employee 
who has been discharged by the deeming provision an opportunity to be heard if he 
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“(i) An officer, other than a member of the services or an educator or a member of the 
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or she wishes to be reinstated.134  If there is a valid reason for absence, officers 
discharged in terms of section (17) (5) (a) (i) of PSA can refer their cases to the head 
of department and also take the head of department’s decision on review. 
 
When an employee is afforded an opportunity to be heard, in terms of section of 
17(5)(b) of PSA and section 14(2) of Employment of Educators Act, the employer’s 
refusal to reinstate the employee does not change into a dismissal.  An employer, in 
this case, the state has discretion either to reinstate or refuse to re-instatement.  
Refusal to re-instate an employee whose employment has been terminated by 
operation of law does not constitute dismissal.135 
 
In Weder v MEC for Department of Health,136 the LC issued a judgment where the 
deeming provision was abused by the employer in the Public Service.  In this case, 
the employer was aware that the employee was sick but still discharged in terms of 
section 17(3)(a)(i) read with section 17(2)(d) of the PSA.137  The employee had 
submitted medical certificates and had advised the employer of the reasons for the 
absence.138  Relying on section 17(3)(b) of the PSA,139 the employee challenged the 
deemed dismissal, however in response the employer confirmed the deemed 
dismissal without furnishing any reasons. 
 
On review, the LC reviewed the decision and set it aside and reasoned that it found it 
difficult to assess whether a decision by the employer could have been reasonable 
and rational when the decision-maker offers no reasons for the decision.  It also held 
that, on the evidence submitted, the MEC’s decision could not have been rational.140  
It was common cause that the employee was in fact sick.  The absence from work 
was not wilful or deliberate.141  
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In Grootboom v National Prosecuting Authority142 the employee was put on 
precautionary suspension.  Whilst on suspension he went on study leave to the UK 
(this was after there was no agreement between him and the employer about some 
issues surrounding the leave).  Two months later his salary was stopped and he was 
informed that his contract of employment had been terminated by operation of law, 
the deeming provision.  He challenged the termination of his contract.  Both the LC 
and LAC held that there was no dismissal but termination by operation of law.  The 
SCA also dismissed his appeal. 
 
However, the Constitutional Court held that for the deeming provision to apply, one of 
the jurisdictional requirements that has to be met is that the employee must be 
absent from work without the employer’s permission.  In the present case the 
employee had been absent from work because he had been suspended by the 
employer, therefore the deeming provision did not apply.  
 
This shows how strict the courts are when it comes to these deeming provisions, 
understandably so since they deprive the employee of an opportunity to refer a 
dismissal dispute for conciliation and arbitration at the CCMA or bargaining council 
and also to the LC. 
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CHAPTER 6 
INSOLVENCY 
 
Insolvency occurs when one is unable to pay one’s debts or discharge one’s 
liabilities.143  Insolvency of either party in an employment relationship may terminate 
the contract of employment.  The Insolvency Act144 was passed in 1936 and has 
been amended many times.  When dealing with insolvency or liquidation, there are 
other statutes that are applicable namely, the Insolvency Act,145 the Companies 
Act,146 the Close Corporations Act,147 the Labour Relations Act148 (hereafter referred 
to as “LRA”) and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act149 (hereafter referred to as 
“BCEA”). 
 
Section 197A of LRA applies to the transfer of a business as a going concern where 
the old employer is insolvent or a scheme of arrangement or compromise is being 
entered into to avoid winding up or sequestration.  
 
6.1 INSOLVENCY OF AN EMPLOYEE 
 
Generally, an employee’s insolvency has no effect on the employment contract 
unless there is a term to that effect in the contract.150  The employer is entitled to 
terminate the employment contract if the insolvency of the employee precludes him 
from performing his or her duties.  In such cases the employer is required to prove 
that the insolvency of the employee renders the continuation of the contract of 
employment impossible, such termination is treated as dismissal due to operational 
requirements. 
 
                                                     
143  Van der Walt, Le Roux and Govindjee Labour Law in Context (2012) 98. 
144  24 of 1936. 
145  Ibid. 
146  61 of 1973. 
147  69 of 1984. 
148  66 of 1995. 
149  75 of 1997. 
150  Grogan Workplace Law 84. 
46 
Section 23(3) of the Insolvency Ac151t states that: 
 
“an insolvent may follow any profession or occupation or enter into any employment, 
but he may not, during the sequestration of his estate without the consent in writing of 
the trustee of his estate, either carry on, or be employed in any capacity or have any 
direct or indirect interest in the business of a trade who is a general dealer or a 
manufacturer: Provided  that any one of the creditors of the insolvent’s estate or the 
insolvent himself may, if the trustee gives or refuses such consent, appeal to the 
Master, whose decision shall be final”. 
 
The insolvent’s ability to enter into an employment contract is dependent on the 
trustee’s consent when it comes to general dealer.  The insolvency then limits one’s 
freedom to contract when it comes to these. 
 
6.2  INSOLVENCY OF AN EMPLOYER 
 
Insolvency of the employer can either be as a result of voluntary liquidation or 
sequestration or compulsory winding-up of an employer.  Sequestration refers to the 
insolvency of an individual while the terms liquidation and winding-up are used in the 
context of the insolvency of companies, close corporations and other legal entities.152  
Companies and close corporations can only be declared insolvent by: 
 
 a court order, 
 on application of either the company or close corporation (employer), 
 on application of creditors. 
 
In SAAPAWU v HL Hall & Sons (Group Services) Ltd & others153 the court was 
required to pronounce on whether the automatic termination of employment contracts 
under the then section 38 of Insolvency Act154 was in conflict with the LRA and 
whether termination of employment due to employer’s insolvency constitute a 
dismissal or not.  The court held that the fact that the LRA was silent on the issue of 
consequences of termination of employment contract due to insolvency does not 
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mean there is a conflict.  Employees who lost their employment due to insolvency of 
the employer were confined to a claim for damages and the court held that such 
termination did not constitute dismissal.  It further held that the reach of LRA halts 
once the insolvency enters the picture.  
 
The Labour Appeal Court (hereafter referred to as “LAC”) held that the termination of 
the employment contract as a result of voluntary liquidation or winding-up of an 
employer constitutes a dismissal.155 
 
The LAC distinguished between the effects of voluntary and compulsory winding-up 
on the termination of employment contracts.  The court held that voluntary winding-
up, being an act of the employer that brings employment contracts to an end, 
constitutes a dismissal within the meaning of section 186(1)(a) of the LRA.  It held 
that only voluntary winding-up had the effect of an employer terminating the contract; 
that is when the company passed a resolution to wind up the company, the contracts 
of employment automatically terminates as the then section 38 kicked in. In effect the 
employer terminates the employment contracts, thus dismissing the employees in 
terms of the LRA.156  Since employees whose services are terminated as a result of 
voluntary liquidation are deemed to have been dismissed, they are entitled to be 
consulted in terms of section 189 of the LRA.   
 
When it comes to compulsory winding-up, the court reasoned that the court still has a 
discretion whether or not to wind up the company, therefore, such decision does not 
rest with the employer but with the High Court.  If the court decides to wind up the 
company, it cannot be said that the employer terminates the employment contract 
because that is the decision of the court.  
 
The court’s decision in this matter is not surprising considering the fact that an 
employer can manipulate the process to get rid of its employees by liquidating itself.  
Section 38 of the Insolvency Act was amended in 2002 and the changes became 
effective on 1 January 2003.  The fact that the contracts of employment are 
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suspended in terms of section 38 and are not terminated suggests that the 
amendments were informed amongst other things to prevent the mischief by resulting 
in the suspension and not termination of the contracts. 
 
Once the application proceeds to the High Court for winding-up, the court will not 
make a final declaration of insolvency but will first place the entity in provisional 
liquidation.  In practice this means the employer could enter into negotiations with a 
prospective buyer and creditors about the survival or continuation of the business of 
the employer.  If the negotiations fail and the parties fail to come to some form of 
arrangement, a final winding-up order will be made. 
 
6.3  EFFECTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF SEQUESTRATION 
 
In view of the provisions that disadvantaged employees of employers under 
sequestration or liquidation, there was a need to amend the Act and the old section 
38 of the Insolvency Act157 has been replaced by Insolvency Amendment Act.158  The 
amendment was intended to address the issue of the right to fair labour practices and 
to protect worker’s rights in the event of insolvency and to give more consideration to 
worker’s rights and reciprocal duties of the employer in the event of insolvency.159 
 
The termination of contracts of employment for the above reason meant that 
employees were not considered as dismissed and therefore they did not receive any 
protection or benefits, the law offered for example severance pay in terms of the 
BCEA or the right not to be unfairly dismissed in terms of the LRA.  
 
One of the significant improvements of the Act is that section 38160 no longer 
provides that the sequestration of the estate of the employer terminate the contract of 
employment.  It states that: 
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“(1) The contracts of service of employees whose employer has been sequestrated 
are suspended with effect from date of granting of a sequestration order. 
 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), during the period of suspension of a contract of 
service referred to in subsection (1)- 
 
(a) An employee whose contract is suspended is not required to render 
services in terms of the contract and is not entitled to any remuneration in 
terms of the contract; and 
 
(b) No employment benefit accrues to an employee in terms of the contract of 
service which is suspended. 
 
(3) An employee whose contract of service is suspended is entitled to unemployment 
benefits in terms of section 35 of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1966 (Act 
No. 30 of 1966), from the date of such suspension, subject to the provisions of 
that Act.” 
 
The employment contracts are suspended until a final trustee or liquidator has been 
duly appointed at the first meeting of creditors. 
 
Another improvement in terms of the section 38 is that an appointed trustee or 
liquidator is required to consult with a registered trade union whose members are 
likely to be affected or the suspended employees directly if they are not represented 
by a trade union.  The purpose of the consultation is to attempt to reach consensus 
on appropriate measures to save the employee’s jobs.  
 
The consultation process referred to in section 38 of the Insolvency Act is almost 
identical to section 189 of the LRA which deals with dismissals based on operational 
requirements of the LRA161 and states the following: 
 
“5) A trustee may not terminate a contract of service unless the trustee has 
consulted with 
 
a) any person with whom the insolvent employer was required to consult, 
immediately before the sequestration, in terms of a collective agreement 
defined in section 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No. 66 of 
1995); 
b) i) a workplace forum defined in section 213 of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995; and 
ii)  any registered trade union whose members are likely to be affected 
termination of the contract of service 
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if there is no such collective agreement that existed immediately prior to the 
sequestration; 
c) a registered trade union representing employees whose contracts of 
service were suspended in terms of subsection (1) and who are likely to be 
affected by the termination of the contract of service, if there is no such 
workplace forum; or 
d) the employees whose contracts of service were suspended in terms of 
subsection (1) and who are likely to be affected by the termination of the 
contract of service or their representatives nominated for that purpose, if 
there is no such trade union. 
6) The consultation referred to in subsection (5) must be aimed at reaching 
consensus on appropriate measures to save or rescue the whole or part of the 
business of the insolvent employer 
a) by the sale of the whole or part of the business of the insolvent employer; 
or 
b) by a transfer as contemplated in section 197A of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995; or 
c) by a scheme or compromise referred to in section 311 of the Companies 
Act, 1973; or 
d) in any other manner. 
7) If any party referred to in subsection (5) wishes to make proposals concerning 
any matter contemplated in subsection (6), that party must submit written 
proposals to the trustee or liquidator within 21 days of the appointment of the 
trustee in terms of section 56, or the appointment of the liquidator in terms of 
section 375 of the Companies Act, 1973, or the appointment of a co-liquidator in 
terms of section 74 of the Close Corporations Act, 1984, or if a co-liquidator is not 
appointed, the date of the conclusion of the first meeting, unless the trustee or 
liquidator and an employee agree otherwise.” 
 
Unlike the provisions of the old section 38, termination of the employment contract is 
subject to the trustee or liquidator to consult with relevant parties unless the parties 
come to some form of agreement. Trade unions and employees need to be notified 
of both the application for as well as the granting of a liquidation order.  This allows 
quicker intervention and engagement by the trade union in appointing their own 
liquidators or in opposing liquidation.  
 
Also until 1 January 2003 section 38 provided for the automatic termination of 
employment contracts on the insolvency of the employer.  After that date the 
amended section 38 provides for the suspension of employment contracts. 
 
In the event that the parties fail to reach an agreement, the suspended contracts 
terminate 45 days after the appointment of the liquidator or trustee.162  The contracts 
of employment will be revived and automatically transferred to the new business in 
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the event that the company is transferred as a going concern due to insolvency.  The 
discussions on transfer of business due to insolvency will be dealt with below. 
 
6.4 TRANSFER OF EMPLOYMENT DUE TO INSOLVENCY 
 
Section 197A of LRA163 states that: 
 
“197A Transfer of contract of employment in circumstances of insolvency –  
 
(1) This section applies to a transfer of a business- 
a) if the old employer is insolvent; or 
b) if a scheme of arrangement or compromise is being entered into to avoid 
winding-up or sequestration for reasons of insolvency. 
2) Despite the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act No. 24 of 1936), if a transfer of a business 
takes place in the circumstances contemplated in subsection (1), unless 
otherwise agreed in terms of section 197(6)- 
a) the new employer is automatically substituted in the place of the old 
employer in all contracts of employment in existence immediately before 
the old employer's provisional winding-up or sequestration; 
b) all the rights and obligations between the old employer and each employee 
at the time of the transfer remain rights and obligations between the old 
employer and each employee; 
c) anything done before the transfer by the old employer in respect of each 
employee is considered to have been done by the old employer; 
d) the transfer does not interrupt the employee's continuity of employment and 
the employee's contract of employment continues with the new employer as 
if with the old employer.  
3) Section 197(3), (4), (5) and (10) applies to a transfer in terms of this section and 
any reference to an agreement in that section must be read as a reference to an 
agreement contemplated in section 197(6). 
4) Section 197(5) applies to a collective agreement or arbitration binding on the 
employer immediately before the employer's provisional winding-up or 
sequestration. 
5) Section 197(7), (8) and (9) does not apply to a transfer in accordance with this 
section.” 
 
The section regulates the transfer of employments contract in circumstances of 
insolvency and it applies despite the provisions of the Insolvency Act.164 
 
It was mentioned above that trustee or liquidator of an insolvent employer is required 
in terms of section 38(5) and (6) of the Insolvency Act to consult with the affected 
employees and their representatives with the purpose of allowing the parties an 
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opportunity to reach consensus on appropriate measures to save or rescue the 
whole or part of the business of the insolvent employer.  These measures include 
amongst other things a scheme or compromise under section 311 of the Companies 
Act. 
 
The new employer is substituted for the old employer in respect of all contracts of 
employment in existence immediately before “the old employer’s provisional winding 
up or sequestration” rather than immediately before the date of transfer as in the 
case of section 197 of the LRA. 
 
Section 197A(2)(b) of the LRA provides that if a scheme of arrangement or 
compromise during the consultation process was entered into to avoid winding-up or 
sequestration for reasons of insolvency, the contracts of all employees automatically 
transfer to the new employer and the continuity of employment is preserved.  
However, the obligations between the old employer and each employee at the time of 
transfer remain rights and obligations between the old employer and each employee, 
they do not transfer automatically to the new employer.  The purpose is to make it 
more attractive to potential investors to rescue ailing business and maintain the 
integrity of the employer’s estate for purposes of winding-up, sequestration or 
compromise.165  
 
An employer that is buying an insolvent business is already taking a risk, to burden 
the new employer with the rights and obligations that existed between the old 
employer and its employees would serve as a disincentive for prospective buyers 
and could leave to liquidation of companies that might have been saved.166  Also, 
transferring obligations between an old employer and each employee to the buyer 
would be contrary to the spirit of the purpose of the Act namely; to advance economic 
development for both employees and the new employer. 
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The primary purpose of section 197A is to preserve employment. It is only fair that 
the new and old employers are not jointly and severally liable for claims against the 
old employer that arose before the transfer. 
 
6.5 CURRENT CHALLENGES OF SECTION 38 OF INSOLVENCY ACT 
 
Without a doubt and even after the amendment of the Act, the insolvency law still 
favours the employer and disadvantages the employee.  Carolus et al states that: 
 
“This means that there are significant organisational and political challenges faced by 
trade unions in ensuring the development of the law to their advantage.” 
 
In order to address this concern, unions should play a more proactive role in order to 
respond to these challenges in the interest of their members.  There need to be a 
shift in the focus and mind set of trade unions in order to expand the scope of 
collective bargaining process.  It is suggested that organised labour should spend 
more time scrutinising the company’s audit and financial reports.  They could also 
influence other provisions of legislation for the benefit of their members for example 
unemployment legal framework should allow claims from workers in respect of 
suspended contracts to receive their salaries and benefits instead of only 
unemployment benefits and provide for shorter time frames for payment. 
 
Section 38(4) of Insolvency Act states that: 
 
“A trustee appointed in terms of section 56, or a liquidator appointed in terms of section 
375 of the Companies Act, 1973 (Act No. 61 of 1973), or a liquidator who, in terms of 
section 74 of the Close Corporations Act, 1984 (Act No. 69 of 1984), remains in office 
after the first meeting and a co-liquidator, if any, appointed by the Master may 
terminate the contracts of service of employees, subject to subsections (5) and (7).” 
 
6.6 PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE CURRENT SITUATION 
 
Carolus et al proposes that in order for the Insolvency Act to be more effective in 
protecting the interest of the workers, company assets should not be bought 
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piecemeal from the estate after the liquidation order has been granted to avoid the 
application of section 197167 of the LRA. 
 
Fraudulent dealings in cases of insolvency and failure to disclose information to 
employees and their trade unions regarding the employer’s financial status an 
ownership should be criminalised. 
 
Claims for wages and severance pay should be treated as secured claims as they 
are explicitly recognised in labour legislation.  SARS should be treated as concurrent 
creditor to ensure effectiveness of a pay-out to employees which is difficult when the 
liquidator has to first pay SARS and other banks. 
 
It looks like further amendments in terms of the insolvency legislation framework are 
still needed.  For example, section 186 of LRA should include termination of 
employment contracts in cases of insolvency; this should not be left to various 
interpretations by courts. 
 
6.7 TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT DUE TO INSOLVENCY V 
A RIGHT TO FAIR LABOUR PRACTICES 
Section 23 of the Constitution168 provides everyone a right to fair labour practices.  
“Everyone” refers to both employees and juristic persons, notwithstanding the fact 
that in terms of the Constitution all rights are not absolute, there are limitations.169  
 
In insolvency cases a consideration of conflicting interests from different stakeholders 
has to be made namely, interests of the employees, employer and the creditors.  An 
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employee’s right to fair labour practices might conflict with a creditor’s right to be 
treated equally and an employer’s right to freedom of trade and to terminate 
employment as a result of economic hardship.  The conflicting interests are obviously 
influenced by other relevant legislation in cases of insolvency namely, LRA, 
Companies Act, Insolvency Act and the Constitution.  In fact Van Eck et al170 states 
that:  
 
“the juncture at which insolvency and labour law meet is an area of legal regulation 
where the tension between commercial interests, on one hand, and, the general right of 
employees to social protection on the other, is arguably at its greatest”. 
 
The LRA171 provides that every employee has a right not be unfairly dismissed. The 
requirements for a fair dismissal are that it must be in accordance with a fair 
procedure and a fair reason (substantive fairness).172  
 
Other aspects of procedural fairness also encompass an investigation into the 
matter, an opportunity to be heard and to be allowed sufficient time to make 
representations.  It is not surprising that the then section 38 which provided for 
automatic and immediate termination of employment contract was challenged on the 
basis of an infringement of a right to fair labour practices.  
 
Van Eck et al173 postulate that in the event of a trustee or liquidator wish or decide to 
terminate an employment contract to make the business more attractive in order to 
be able to sell as a going concern, he only needs to comply with the procedures laid 
down in terms of Insolvency Act.  The writer concurs with him in his suggestion that 
this seems to be a misalignment in the respective labour and insolvency legislative 
framework.  
 
The LRA also recognises that the a right to fair labour practices also extends to 
employers hence it is recognised that an employer may dismiss an employee based 
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on operational requirements of which economic hardship is encompassed in the 
definition of the term operational requirements.174 
 
Even though employees are entitled to claim from the estate of the insolvent 
employer they are not regarded as number one priority.  There is also a limitation in 
terms of the amounts that they could claim in terms of salaries and wages. 
 
The recourse that is available to employees whose contract have been terminated by 
the liquidator or trustee without following the procedures contained in the LRA and 
Insolvency Act would be application for an interdict to the High court or Labour 
Court175 to halt the process of termination of the employment contract. 
 
In CPI v CCMA & others176 the LC held that dismissal of an employee without being 
consulted by an employer that has been put on provisional liquidation before the 
expiry of the 45 days contemplated by section 38(9) of Insolvency Act was unfair.177  
The dismissal also did not comply with section 197B of the LRA which also requires 
and employer to consult with the employee. 
 
It is submitted that there is no apparent reason as to why termination of employment 
due to insolvency initiated by or on behalf of the shareholders should not be included 
to form part of section 186 of LRA.  
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CHAPTER 7 
EFFLUXION OF TIME 
 
Some employment contracts have a specific start date and a specific end date.  
There are also contracts that are concluded for a specific project or purpose.  These 
contracts are referred to as fixed-term contracts.  Fixed-term contracts are often used 
in the labour field for different reasons for example for projects that are for a specific 
time period or to fill positions where an employee is on maternity leave.  In the 
construction industry, fixed-term contracts could be terminated at the arrival of a 
specific event, for instance a plasterer's contract will terminate if that portion of the 
project is finalised. 
 
These contracts come to a natural end at the time stipulated in the contract or at the 
arrival of a specific event.  Should such a contract expire, there is no dismissal 
because the contract terminates due to effluxion of time and not by means of an act 
of an employer.  
 
The termination of a fixed-term contract by effluxion of time and the attainment of 
agreed or implied retirement age give rise to the lawful termination of an employment 
contract.  The CCMA and the Labour Court have no jurisdiction to deal with disputes 
arising out of such termination because there is no dismissal. 
 
In National Union of Metalworkers v SA Five Engineering178 employees were 
contracted to reconstruct and refit a ship.  The project had specific stages and was 
by nature, of a limited duration.  The employees were employed for limited periods.  
The contracts of employment were vague as they had no specific dates of 
termination, but rather the time of termination was linked to the completion of project 
goal.  The employees argued that all their contracts should have been terminated at 
the completion of the project.  The employer argued that their tasks for which they 
were employed were completed and therefore they needed to be retrenched.  The 
court found that the termination of these fixed-term contracts was not unfair because 
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the tasks were completed and there was no further work for them.  The LC held that 
the contract clearly indicated it would end once the task was completed and indeed 
the task was completed and there was no dismissal.   
 
In Nkopane & others v Independent Electoral Commission179 the IEC needed to 
retrench a number of employees as there was no work for them.  Their letters of 
appointment stated that they were employed on contract for “two to three years”.  
Later the parties agreed upon termination dates.  The court found that these were 
fixed-term contracts and that the IEC could not terminate them before the end of the 
term.  The court confirmed the common law rule. 
 
The difference in findings of the court in these two cases is based on the facts of the 
matter.  In the IEC180 case, there were specific dates to which the parties committed 
themselves.  If the employer had no further work for the employees it had only one 
option and that is to pay out the remainder of the contract.  In the National Union of 
Metalworkers181 case there was no commitment to a specific date but rather that the 
contracts would automatically terminate upon the completion of each employees task 
for which they were appointed.  The principle remains that, fixed-term contracts 
cannot be terminated prior to the date agreed upon unless there is material breach or 
repudiation of the contract.   
 
In the case of fixed-term contract, the employment relationship terminates at the 
expiry of the term on a specified date or when a specified future event occurs for 
example at the end of a particular project if the contract expressly provides that the 
contract will end at the completion of the project.  
 
In Potgieter v George Municipality182 the contract contained a phrase that indicated 
that the employment contract was “linked to the terms of office of the executive 
mayor”.  The contract also clearly stipulated that it would come to an end a month 
after the then executive mayor left office.  When the mayor’s term ended the 
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applicant’s contract was terminated and he was given a month’s notice.  He claimed 
that he had been dismissed.  The claim was dismissed as his contract was on a 
fixed-term basis and there was no dismissal. 
 
In Malinga & Others and Pro-Al Engineering CC183 the arbitrator held that employees 
who had signed limited duration contracts had failed to prove that they had a 
reasonable expectation that their contracts would be renewed.  So, when their 
contracts were terminated there was no dismissal.  
 
The employment contract also terminates when an employee reaches normal or 
agreed retirement age.  In circumstances like these it is said that the employment 
contract has terminated due to effluxion of time.  Section 187(2)(b) of the LRA184 
states a dismissal based on age is fair if the employee has reached the normal or 
agreed retirement age for  persons employed in that capacity. 
 
7.1 RETIREMENT 
 
Agreed retirement age is normally based on contractual principles usually at the 
commencement of employment relationship where an employee is told in advance 
that his or her employment would end at a specific retirement age.  The onus of 
proving that the employee has reached an agreed or normal retirement age rests 
with the employer unless the parties have concluded a new employment contract 
post retirement date.  In such cases the onus rests with the employee to prove the 
existence of such a contract.185  The agreement could either be between the 
employer and the trade union or between the employer and individual employees.  
 
It has also been held that voluntary contribution to a pension fund which sets a 
retirement age denotes agreement between the employer and the employee that the 
employer will retire at that age.186 
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There is neither requirement in terms of the LRA nor any labour legislation for that 
matter that there must be an agreement in advance on the retirement age, where 
there is no agreement, the “normal” retirement age applies.  
 
The agreed retirement age should not be discriminatory by for example providing for 
a different age lower for a particular group of employees like female employees. 
Even if an agreement between an employee and an employer with regard to 
retirement age exists, an employer challenged for unfair discrimination on the basis 
of an impermissible ground in this case gender, will have challenges defending such 
a claim.  
 
Section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act187 prohibits policies or practices that 
discriminate against employees on certain grounds which include age and gender. 
However, discrimination on age can be regarded as fair in certain circumstances for 
example refusal to employ someone below the age of fifteen.  Employment of 
children less than fifteen years of age is prohibited in terms of BCEA.188  
 
Section 187(1)(f) of the LRA provides that a dismissal is automatically unfair if the 
reason for the employer’s decision to dismiss the employee is direct or indirect 
discrimination against the employee on any arbitrary grounds which includes 
amongst other things, age of the employee.  
 
Section 187(2)(b) of the LRA states that: 
 
“(b)  a dismissal based on age is fair if the employee has reached the normal or 
agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity.” 
 
In essence this means that when an employee has reached the agreed or normal 
retirement age, an employer can terminate the contract of employment relying only 
on the fact that the employee has reached agreed or normal retirement age.  
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An employer who wishes to dismiss older employees that have become 
incapacitated or infirm before reaching agreed or normal retirement age, may not rely 
on the provisions of section 187(2)(b) of the LRA but may terminate the employment 
contract by following the procedure for termination of employment due to incapacity. 
Also, an employee may not disguise dismissal for operational requirements as 
termination of employment contract based on section 187(2)(b) but will have to follow 
the provisions of section 189 of the LRA. 
 
According to Grogan,189 the norm in normal retirement age is determined by the 
capacity in which the person is employed and presumably by reference to the 
practice in the particular enterprise or sector.  Normal retirement age is the age at 
which employees employed in the same category have generally retired and does 
not become “normal” merely because the employer declares it to be such.190  The 
court held that: 
 
“A retirement age that is not an agreed retirement age becomes a normal retirement 
age when employees have been retiring at that age over a certain long period - so long 
that it can be said that the norm for employees in that workplace or for employees in a 
particular category is to retire at a particular age.” 
 
If for example, in the absence of an agreed retirement age, employees in a particular 
organisation have in the past twenty years been retiring at age 63 without fail, age 63 
could be regarded as normal retirement age for that organisation.  This means that 
the period must be sufficiently long and the number of employees who have retired at 
that age must be sufficiently large to justify that it is a norm for employees to retire at 
that particular age. 
 
The court further held that even if the period is long enough but the number of 
employees that have retired is not large enough, it could be difficult to prove that a 
norm has been established and also if the period is not long enough but the number 
is large enough it could be difficult to prove that a norm had not been established.  
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“Agreed” retirement age will always take precedence over “normal” retirement age. 
This means that an employer cannot rely on the fact that it has always required its 
employees to retire at a certain age if the employee’s employment contract that has 
been transferred to another employer as a going concern specified a later retirement 
age.191  
 
This was confirmed in SA Clothing and Textile Workers Union v Rubin Sportswear192 
where Rubin Sportswear and Val Hau et Cie, a company that previously employed 
the employees reached an agreement to sell a company as a going concern on the 
same terms and conditions of employment.  The employees were between ages 60 
and 63 years of age.  Subsequent to the transfer, there was no further agreement 
between the parties with regard to retirement age.  When Rubin Sportswear informed 
the employees that the retirement age was 60 years, and offered them fixed-term 
contracts valid for a year they declined and were subsequently dismissed on the 
basis that they had reached the normal retirement age.  The court held that the 
dismissal was automatically unfair.  
 
On appeal the LAC193 upheld the decision of the LC and held that where the 
employment contract is silent on the retirement age, the employer cannot unilaterally 
impose a retirement age.  It found that the appellant’s conduct in unilaterally fixing 
the retirement age at 60 constituted a unilateral change on the employees’ terms and 
conditions of employment which it had no right to do.  The purported change in 
employment conditions was unlawful, wrongful and of no legal effect.194  A similar 
principle was adopted in Randall v Karan.195 
 
In the event that there is no agreed retirement age and the employer wants to 
introduce one, the court held that the employer should negotiate with the employees 
on what should be the retirement age until an agreement has been reached, if there 
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is an agreement that would be an agreed retirement age however only applicable to 
those employees in agreement, it cannot be imposed on other employees. 
 
The second option for an employer would be to institute a lock out in terms of section 
67 of the LRA and compel the employees to agree on the proposed retirement age. 
The court held that these are the only two options that could have been followed by 
Rubin Sportswear and not impose the retirement age on the employees.  
 
In Botha v Du Toit Very & Partners CC196 the LC held that an employer was entitled 
to dismiss an employee who had reached the age of 66 even though there was no 
agreed or normal retirement age that could be established within the employer’s 
business.  It further held that this did not entitle the employee to remain in 
employment until he chose to resign.  The court reasoned that age 65 was accepted 
as a normal retirement age for the work that he was engaged in.  The employer was 
only faulted for not consulting with the employee prior to termination of employment.  
 
Whilst it is not disputed that age 65 is accepted as normal retirement age, the 
decision in Rubin Sportswear197 and in Botha198 seem to be in conflict with each 
other.  In the former the court rightfully held that the employer cannot unilaterally 
impose a retirement age if there is no agreement or the contract is silent, whereas in 
the latter the court held that the employer can impose as the employee cannot be 
expected to continue working until he chose to resign.  The reasoning of the court is 
flawed in the sense that is unfair to expect the employee to leave with the 
consequences of the employer’s failure to deal with the matter at the commencement 
or during the contract period.  The employer determines the employment conditions, 
in this particular case Du Toit Very & Partners should have made provision for 
retirement age.  If the age of the employee was 64, it is not clear whether the 
decision of the court would have been any different as it is accepted that normal 
retirement age in certain circumstances is 63.  
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Whilst it is accepted that the employee cannot expect to work until he decides to 
resign, the court did not give reason as to why the parties could not negotiate and 
agree on retirement age instead of imposing.  It only faulted the employer for failure 
to consult, it is submitted that consulting as it is suggested does not constitute 
negotiating as required.  
 
An employer cannot carte blanche dismiss employees by giving them the requisite 
notice. If they do so they will have to face the consequences of their actions.199 
 
The concept of retirement age is arbitrary in that employees who have reached 
normal or agreed retirement age may still perform their duties adequately.  The 
retirement age could purely be for reasons of making way for new and younger 
employees.  
 
Importantly, with the provision of section 187(2)(b) is the wording at the end of the 
section which reads “for persons employed in that capacity”.  In Rubin Sportswear200 
the court had this to say about the wording: 
 
“However, it is important to bear in mind that that word is used in relation to persons 
employed in the same capacity as the person whose dismissal on the basis of having 
reached normal retirement age is in issue. Sec 187 (2) (b) must, therefore, not be read 
as if it says “(d)espite subsection 1 (f), a dismissal based on age is fair if the employee 
has reached the normal or agreed retirement age.”  It includes the words at the end “for 
persons employed in that capacity.” What the section does not make clear is whether 
the words “persons employed in that capacity” refer to such persons who are in the 
same employer’s employ or whether it also refers to persons who are employed in the 
same capacity by other employers in the same industry or in general.” 
 
The wording proves that is quite possible for an employer to have different retirement 
age for its workforce depending on the capacity they are employed.  For example, 
retirement age for executives could be different to that of artisans. 
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7.2  DOES REACHING NORMAL OR AGREED AGE RETIREMENT AGE 
CONSTITUTE DISMISSAL? 
 
What is of interest with section 187(2)(b) of the LRA is that it states that termination 
of an employment contract is a dismissal whereas it has been argued that an 
employment contract terminates by effluxion of time when an employee has reached 
normal or agreed retirement age, and does not constitute dismissal.  
 
When employees reach agreed or normal retirement age, termination of the 
employment contract is consensual between two parties, it is not a decision of the 
employer, and such termination does not fit the definition of dismissal as per section 
186 of the LRA.201  Perhaps the legislature had intended section 187(2)(b) to include 
dismissal after the employee has gone past the agreed or normal retirement age. 
The wording of section 187(2)(b) states that a dismissal is fair if the employee has 
reached the normal or agreed retirement age.  It does not state “when” he reaches 
normal or agreed retirement age.  
 
The key issue is whether termination of an employment contract because the 
employee has reached retirement age constitutes a dismissal or is merely 
termination of the contract due to effluxion of time.  On the face of it, the wording of 
the section seems to suggest that when an employee reaches retirement age 
termination of the contract of employment will constitute a dismissal.  This would then 
require that such a dismissal would then have to be procedurally and substantively 
fair.  
                                                     
201  “Dismissal” means that 
(a) an employer has terminated a contract of employment with or without notice;  
(b) an employee reasonably expected the employer to renew a fixed term contract of 
employment on the same or similar terms but the employer offered to renew it on less 
favourable terms, or did not renew it; 
(c) an employer refused to allow an employee to resume work after she- 
(i)  took maternity leave in terms of any law, collective agreement or her contract of 
employment; or 
(ii)  was absent from work for up to four weeks before the expected date, and up to 
eight weeks after the actual date,  
of the birth of her child; 
(d)  an employer who dismissed a number of employees for the same or similar reasons has 
offered to re-employ one or more of them but has refused to re-employ another; or 
(e) an employee terminated a contract of employment with or without notice because the 
employer made continued employment intolerable for the employee. 
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Grogan202 seems to believe that it does constitute dismissal but a fair dismissal. 
Section 187(2)(b) does not state that an employee who is compelled to retire on 
reaching agreed or normal retirement age is not dismissed; it states that if such an 
employee challenges the fairness of his or her dismissal, the dismissal cannot be 
ruled unfair. 
 
However, the courts are divided in this in that in certain decisions it has been held 
that if an employee has reached the agreed or normal retirement age and the 
employer terminates the employment contract, termination under those 
circumstances does not constitute dismissal.203  
 
In Schmahmann v Concept Communications204 the applicant’s services were 
terminated having been notified by the employer that her employment contract would 
be terminated to coincide with its changeover to a computerized system of 
bookkeeping, and that she would be retired at the age of 65 years.  The applicant 
alleged that she was dismissed and that the dismissal was automatically unfair on 
the basis of age.  This was due to the fact that the employer had not agreed on a 
retirement age with the applicant, and that, on the evidence of an expert witness, 
there was no normal retirement age for persons employed in the capacity as the 
applicant. 
 
The Labour Court held that, in terms of the definition of a dismissal in section 186 of 
the LRA there had been no dismissal, and as a consequence thereof the applicant 
could not claim to have been dismissed.  It held that an employee is not dismissed if 
that person is retired by his or her employer on attaining the agreed or normal age of 
retirement.  In this case the court failed to consider the fact that there was no agreed 
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or normal retirement age, the employer imposed the retirement age on the 
applicant.205 
 
The court held further that, when an employer and an employee agree specifically or 
by implication on normal retirement age in advance that the effluxion of time is to 
operate as the “guillotine which severs their employment relationship”, then it cannot 
be said that when this date arrives there has been a dismissal by the employer 
although the relationship and the contractual obligations are terminated.  
 
The implication of this ruling is that when an employment contract is terminated on 
the grounds set out in section 187(2)(b), the employer is not required to comply with 
the requirements of procedural and substantive fairness. 
 
According to Bosch206 “there was no agreement on retirement age and it could thus 
not be said that the applicants” contract had been terminated by any means other 
than the employer’s action in bringing it to an end.  She was thus “dismissed” and 
entitled to claim that such dismissal was unfair.  Bosch goes on to say that “the court 
in Schmahmann should not, have been so quick to find that once a retirement date 
had been attained, there was no ‘dismissal’ within the meaning of the LRA”. 
 
In Gqibitole v Pace Community College207 the employee, Ms Gqibitole, claimed that 
she had been dismissed, and that the dismissal was automatically unfair based on 
age.  In perusing the facts of the case the court came to the conclusion that the 
agreed retirement date was set at 1 March 2000, but that the applicant was 
dismissed on 30 June 1998, before the agreed retirement date as per the retirement 
policy of the respondent.  It held that the employer unfairly discriminated against the 
applicant directly on the basis of age.  The court also found that there was no 
“normal” retirement age for employees employed in the applicant’s capacity because 
there were other teachers employed with the respondent who taught well beyond the 
age of 60, and even into their early 70’s. The Labour Court held that it was 
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automatically unfair to dismiss an employee based on age before attaining an agreed 
retirement age thus agreeing with the applicant. 
  
In Schweitzer v Waco Distributors208 the court reasoned that when an employee 
reaches retirement age, the employment contract expires by effluxion of time and 
terminates automatically and does not constitute dismissal.  It also held that:  
 
“The conditions which must exist in order for a dismissal to be fair in terms of section 
187(2) (b) are the following:  
(a)  the dismissal must be based on age;  
(b)  the employer must have a normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed 
in the capacity of the employee concerned;  
(c)  the employee must have reached the age referred to in (b) above.”  
 
Once all these three conditions are present, as is the case in this matter, section 
187(2)(b) states that the “dismissal is fair”.  The court has no competence to enquire 
into the fairness of the dismissal save, maybe to declare what the statute says 
anyway.  
 
It was further held that a decision to dismiss was fair and that the employer was not 
required to follow a fair procedure.  Van der Walt et al209 agrees with this court 
decision and states that the employment contract terminates automatically when the 
employee reaches agreed or normal retirement age. 
 
Thus, as far as the question as to whether or not dismissing an employee, or 
otherwise put ending to the employment relationship upon reaching an agreed or 
normal retirement age is concerned, it seems as though the courts have stayed hard 
to the finding that such a state of affairs does not amount to a dismissal as defined in 
section 188 of the LRA, and where an employer does dismiss an employee before 
reaching the agreed or normal retirement age, once such an age is determined, it will 
be regarded as an automatically unfair dismissal based on age. 
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7.3 WORK BEYOND NORMAL OR AGREED RETIREMENT AGE 
 
In cases where an employee was permitted to work beyond the agreed or normal 
retirement age, the courts have adopted different approaches. 
 
The one view is that the dismissal is not automatically unfair and that section 
187(2)(b) is a complete defence.  The other is that section 187(2)(b) is not a 
complete defence and the dismissal is automatically unfair.210 
 
In Schweitzer v Waco Distributors211 the applicant’s employment was terminated 
when he was 67 years old, the agreed retirement age being 65, he was therefore 
allowed to work beyond the agreed retirement age.  
 
The termination was not based on any complaints regarding his work performance or 
conduct and the court found that he had not been afforded a fair hearing before the 
decision was taken to terminate his services.  The applicant claimed that his 
dismissal was automatically unfair in terms of section 187(1)(f) of the LRA.  The 
question in this case was whether it is required to afford an employee sufficient 
opportunity to make representations before he is dismissed, so as to bring it in line 
with the requirement of procedural fairness, after he has reached the “normal or 
agreed” retirement age.  It was held that there are no requirements of fairness in 
retiring an employee on reaching the “normal or agreed” retirement age.  What if that 
employee is not dismissed on reaching such an age and is allowed to carry on 
working past that age, is he then allowed the opportunity of fairness?  In this case 
Zondo J found that there is no such requirement.  On the plain wording of section 
187(2)(b), it was held, the dismissal of an employee who has passed the normal age 
of retirement “is fair”, thus leaving the court no scope to pursue the inquiry any 
further. 
 
In Datt v Gunnebo (Pty) Ltd212 the applicant had signed a revised retirement age 
agreement shortly before his 65th birthday setting the retirement age at 65 with the 
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option to continue working “with the agreement of the company”.  His original 
contract did not specify a retirement age.  The applicant continued to work for the 
company even after he had turned 65 and the Managing Director requested him to 
continue to work until such time the parties mutually agree on a date when the 
applicant should retire.  
 
Two years later a new Managing Director informed the applicant that he must retire 
based solely on grounds that he had passed the normal retirement age.  The LC 
found that the conduct of the employer constituted an automatically unfair dismissal 
in that the new agreement had extended the retirement age to an unspecified date 
and precluded the respondent from reliance on section 187(2)(b) of the LRA.213  It 
further held that the conduct of the employer constituted a unilateral termination of 
employment contract on notice, which constitutes a dismissal for purposes of the 
meaning of dismissal.214  
 
The situation would have been different if the new agreement included a specified 
date new retirement date.  Steenkamp J stated that in this case, the employer cannot 
rely on section 187(2)(b) of the LRA as a justification to unilaterally terminate the 
applicant’s employment based on age.  Although an employer should always be able 
to dismiss an employee in circumstances like this, where the parties had agreed to 
an amended retirement age, the provision must still be a fair reason and the 
employer must follow the fair procedural rules of dismissal.  Age being the reason 
does not constitute a fair dismissal.  
 
The company alleged that the applicant was a risk to the company and should make 
way for new employees.215  Even though this point was not explored further by the 
court, this suggests that the real reason for termination of employment contract was 
not due to the fact that he had worked past his retirement age but that he was a risk 
to the company.  It is possible that if the applicant was not viewed as a risk to the 
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company, the company would have been very happy to keep him in its employ 
irrespective of his age.  
 
In Solidarity obo Dobson v Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority216 an 
employer had employed the applicant when she was 68 years of age; the retirement 
age in terms of the company’s retirement policy was 65.  The applicant’s services 
were terminated three years after she was employed and the employer argued that 
he was entitled to do so based on the fact that she had reached the normal 
retirement age.  The CCMA held that by knowingly employing the applicant when she 
was past the normal retirement age the respondent had ignored and breached its 
own policy and rendered the dismissal unfair. 
 
In certain cases where an employee’s employment contract has been terminated due 
to employee reaching retirement age, the courts will not only rule on the fairness of 
the dismissal but also on whether the employer’s conduct amounts to discrimination 
or not, noting that that there is nothing precluding dual claims.  In the event that the 
conduct of the employer amounts to discrimination, the court can award 
compensation amounting to a maximum of twenty four month’s remuneration for 
automatically unfair dismissal and an additional amount of damages in respect of the 
employer’s unfair discrimination.217 
 
It is the view of the writer that when employees work beyond the normal or agreed 
retirement age, the employment contract is not terminated by effluxion of time.  When 
an employer decides to terminate the employment contract past retirement date by 
giving notice to the employee, an employer cannot claim that such termination is by 
effluxion of time, such termination is the decision of the employer.  Such an employer 
will be required to provide a fair reason for the termination and to follow a fair 
process.  
 
                                                     
216  [2004] 12 BALR 1546 (CCMA). 
217  In Evans v Japanese School of Johannesburg [2006] 12 BLLR 1146 (LC) the court awarded an 
additional amount of R200 000 in damages in respect of the employer’s unfair discrimination. 
72 
As suggested above, an employee who wishes to terminate employment contracts of 
employees that have worked beyond normal or agreed retirement age will have to 
consult the affected employees and negotiate a new retirement date.  
 
A fair dismissal is a fundamental right and it cannot just be assumed that employees 
have waived that right the moment they work beyond retirement age.  The writer 
tends to agree with other court decisions which states that an employee must be 
given notice prior to termination of employment.218  
 
7.4 FIXED-TERM CONTRACT 
 
A fixed-term contract of employment is a contract for a limited and specified period of 
time.219  It automatically ends when the period agreed to has lapsed or when the 
project for which the employee was employed for has been completed.  Such 
employment contract terminates by effluxion of time and is not terminated by the 
employer.  This means that no dismissal has taken place.  Consequently, an 
employee is precluded from seeking protection in terms of section 186(1) of the LRA. 
 
On the other hand, premature termination of an employee’s fixed-term contract is an 
invitation to challenges of unfair dismissal based on repudiation.  In Buthelezi V 
Municipal Demarcation Board220 the court held that even though the LRA, specifically 
section 186 does not specifically deal with premature termination of contract 
constitutes dismissal and is still manifestly unfair.  
 
The parties enter into a valid fixed-term contract with the intention that it will endure 
until the end of the contract, therefore employers may not retrench employees for 
operational requirements if they are on fixed-term contracts.  The LAC in this case 
held that there is no right to terminate a fixed employment contract in the absence of 
repudiation or material breach of the contract even on notice unless the contract 
expressly makes such a provision. In further held that no party is entitled to later seek 
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to escape its obligations in terms of a contract on the basis that it’s assessment of 
the future had been erroneous.221  
 
In FP Dennis v Kouga Municipality222 Mr Dennis, the applicant approached the High 
Court alleged that he was dismissed without due notice and without any disciplinary 
hearing being held into the allegations levelled against him in a charge sheet, which 
was given to him some time before his dismissal.  He sought a declarator to the 
effect that his purported termination of employment contract with the respondent be 
declared to be unlawful, and in breach thereof.   
 
The applicant in this case chose to refer his case to the High Court instead of the 
Labour Court.  The High Court held that the facts of his case enabled him to plead a 
cause of action that would be sustainable in both the High Court and the Labour 
Court.  He pleaded his case to fall within the High Court’s jurisdiction as a breach of 
contract, which he was entitled to do so.223 
 
The court held that the fact that the respondent’s conduct towards him also violated 
his right to fair labour practices, that his dismissal was not for a fair reason, and it 
was procedurally unfair, does not alter his position.  The High Court ruled that the 
termination of the applicant’s contract of employment without a hearing constituted a 
breach of contract and ordered his reinstatement.224  It further held that the 
respondent was not precluded from conducting a disciplinary hearing if it believed 
there were grounds to do so, once the applicant has resumed his duties.  
 
In Abdulla v Kouga Municipality225 the applicant whose fixed-term contract was 
prematurely terminated contended that his dismissal was in breach of his contract of 
employment.  He alleged that the termination itself amounted to a repudiation of his 
contract because it was in breach of the employer’s fundamental obligation not to 
terminate the contract without lawful cause.  The applicant also claimed that the 
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failure to follow a proper procedure before terminating his services was also in 
breach of his contract.  The respondent’s reason for terminating the contract was 
based on the fact that it had lost confidence in him.  The respondent contended that 
mere existence of such a lack of confidence constituted sufficient grounds for the 
lawful termination of the contract.  
 
The LC was required to determine whether the municipality was entitled to terminate 
the employment relationship summarily.  It ruled that summary termination of the 
applicant’s services was an unlawful, but given the breakdown of trust an order of 
reinstatement would not be appropriate.226 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE LEGALITY OF AUTOMATIC TERMINATION IN TRIPARTITE 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
 
8.1 THE AUTOMATIC TERMINATION OF LABOUR BROKER’S EMPLOYEES 
 
Section 198 of the LRA227 regulates the employment relationship between a 
Temporary Employment Services (hereafter referred to as “TES”), a worker (the 
employee) of TES and a client. It also regulates the liability aspect of the relationship. 
 
Employers, or “clients” make use of TES often referred to as labour brokers for 
various reasons including temporal replacement of staff for example replacement of 
employees that are on maternity leave, to meet employer’s business demands for 
staff during certain periods or seasons, the relative ease with which under-performing 
or misbehaving placements can be replaced and to avoid the cost associated with 
unfair dismissal proceedings and remedies that could be afforded to employees. 
 
Generally, employers find the use of labour brokers to be less costly than indefinite 
contracts for example employers are not obligated to pay benefits like medical aid 
and pension fund contributions for employees on fixed-term contracts.  The client 
does not acquire any liability for unfair dismissal if the labour broker decides to 
terminate the services of the unwanted employee, liability lies with the labour broker.  
 
The contracts of the labour brokers would typically include automatic termination 
clauses that provide for the automatic termination of employment contracts between 
the labour brokers and their employees in circumstances where the labour broker’s 
clients no longer requires the services of such employees, where the labour broker’s 
contract with the client expires228 or for whatsoever reason.  In essence this means 
the employment contracts can be terminated for no reason at all.  
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Typically what would happen is that, the client would just advise the labour broker 
that the services of the employee are no longer needed, the labour broker would 
merely inform the employee that the contract with the client had been terminated and 
consequently, in the absence of alternative positions being found for the employee, 
the latter’s services would no longer be required.  
 
That means there would then be no hearing229 or consultation230 with the employee 
and no severance benefits would be paid either, the TES or labour broker would 
simply argue that the contract terminated automatically.  It is clear that the motivating 
factor for clients in the engagement of labour broking services is to circumvent the 
gamut of statutory rights and obligations that would typically arise in a standard 
employment relationship.  Their contractual obligations are circumscribed by the 
commercial contract concluded and generally indemnify them against any 
responsibility towards the labour broker’s employees.231 
 
Section 198 of the LRA reads:  
 
“Temporary Employment Services 
 
(1) In this section, "temporary employment service" means any person who, for 
reward, procures for or provides to a client other persons- 
(a)  who render services to, or perform work for, the client; and 
(b)  who are remunerated by the temporary employment service. 
(2)  For the purposes of this Act, a person whose services have been procured for or 
provided to a client by a temporary employment service is the employee of that 
temporary employment service, and the temporary employment service is that 
person's employer. 
(3)  Despite subsections (1) and (2), a person who is an independent contractor is not 
an employee of a temporary employment service, nor is the temporary 
employment service the employer of that person. 
(4)  The temporary employment service and the client are jointly and severally liable if 
the temporary employment service, in respect of any of its employees, 
contravenes- 
(a)  a collective agreement concluded in a bargaining council that regulates 
terms and conditions of employment; 
(b)  a binding arbitration award that regulates terms and conditions of 
employment; 
(c)  the Basic Conditions of Employment Act; or 
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(d)  a determination made in terms of the Wage Act …” 
 
Section 198(2)232 stipulates that the temporary employment service is the employer 
of the person whose services have been procured for a client.  Section 198(4) limits 
the client’s liability to joint and several liability with the employer to a contravention of 
the terms and conditions of a collective agreement, arbitration award, sectoral 
determination or provision of the BCEA.  This working arrangement is endorsed by 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Recommendation 197 of 2006.233 
 
In the recent case of NUMSA v Abancedisi Labour Services234 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (hereinafter referred to as “the SCA”) overturned an earlier decision of the 
Labour Appeal Court in National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v Abancedisi 
Labour Services235 (hereinafter referred to as Abancedisi) and found that the 
respondent labour broker, Abancedisi did indeed dismiss its employees who had 
been placed with a client after the client excluded them from its premises.  Although 
the employees remained nominally on the labour broker’s payroll, it did not pay them 
and made no effort to secure them alternative work.  The SCA found that nothing 
resembling an employment relationship remained between the parties and that the 
employees had been unfairly dismissed. 
 
Background to this case is that during 2001, Kitsanker (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter referred 
to as Kitsanker) concluded an agreement with Abancedisi to provide it with 
employees.  The employees who were employed directly by Kitsanker entered into 
voluntary retrenchments and were immediately re-employed by Abancedisi on a 
limited duration contract for which their services would be at Kitsanker's disposals but 
the location and terms and conditions of employment remained precisely as before. 
 
After a work stoppage during July 2001, Kitsanker required the employees to sign a 
code of conduct to regulate industrial action. Kitsanker refused to allow any 
employee who did not sign the code of conduct onto its premises. Upon enquiry from 
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the Union of Metalworkers of SA (hereinafter referred to as NUMSA), Abancedisi 
confirmed Kitsanker’s position and stated that the employees would not be paid any 
wages since they were only paid for work performed.  An unfair dismissal dispute 
was referred to the Bargaining Council in which Abancedisi claimed that the 
employees had not been dismissed but in fact remained on their payroll.  Thereafter, 
the dispute was referred to the Labour Court where the same point in limine was 
raised and upheld. 
 
On appeal to the LAC236 the court maintained the view that the employment 
relationship had continued and that the employees' situation had merely amounted to 
an indefinite suspension. 
 
The employees thereafter appealed to the SCA. In reference to the employment 
contract, the SCA found that it was specifically linked to the Kitsanker project237 as 
Abancedisi had made no effort to secure alternative work for the employees after the 
expulsion of employees by Kitsanker, and Kitsanker filled the employees’ posts, the 
contract of employment had been terminated.238  The SCA further found that 
Abancedisi had not paid the employees any wages, and there was nothing even 
slightly resembling the characteristics of an employment relationship remaining 
between the parties beyond the illusory retention of employees on Abancedisi’s 
payroll.  The effect of Abancedisi’s conduct was that there was material breach of the 
employment contract that entitled the employees to cancel it.239  The court found that 
the employees had been dismissed in terms of section 188(1) of the LRA and that 
the dismissal was unfair.  Abancedisi was ordered to pay the employees twelve 
months’ compensation each and costs. 
 
The lesson for labour brokers in this case is that when a client notifies a labour 
broker that it no longer wants the labour broker’s employees on its premises, the 
labour broker has an obligation to source alternative employment for such employees 
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failing which consult with its employees in terms of section 189 of the LRA.240  The 
court noted that the fact that Abancedisi did not start retrenchment procedures 
confirmed the notion that the employees had already been dismissed.  It also echoed 
the views that had been made in earlier judgements241 that employment contracts 
containing automatic termination clauses conflict with the employee’s right not to be 
unfairly dismissed under the LRA and Constitution and offends public policy.242 
 
In Sindane v Prestige Cleaning Services243 the Labour Court had to consider the 
legality of the automatic termination clause in the employment contract.  The issue in 
this case was whether an employee previously on a fixed-term contract was 
dismissed or not within the meaning of section 186244 of the LRA.  The employment 
contract stipulated that upon termination of the contract between the TES and the 
client to whom the employee rendered services, the employee’s employment contract 
would automatically terminate.  The employment contract had been terminated as a 
result of the client scaling down its contract with the TES by cancelling a contract in 
terms of which an extra cleaner had been provided to them.  The court held that the 
termination of employment did not constitute dismissal because the reason for the 
termination of employment contract is not due to the conduct of the employer, that is 
the labour broker but it is due to the conduct of the client.245  The court relied on the 
wording of section 186 of LRA.246  
 
In SA Post Office v Mampeule247 the court was required to consider the legality of the 
automatic termination clause however in this case there was no involvement of a 
labour broker.  In this case an employee was appointed as Chief Executive Officer 
(hereafter referred to as “CEO”) on a fixed-term contract of employment contract.  Mr 
Mampeule was also appointed as an executive director of the company.  The 
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employer’s articles of association stipulated that the employee’s appointment as 
executive director was an inherent job requirement and that if he ceased to hold an 
office for any reason whatsoever including removal by shareholders, his employment 
contract would automatically terminate.  Mr Mampeule was removed by shareholders 
as a director and was advised that his employment contract had terminated 
automatically.  
 
In reaching its decision, the LC held that any act by an employer that directly or 
indirectly results in the termination of the employment contract constitutes a 
dismissal.  The employer terminated the employment contract by severing the 
umbilical cord that ties the employee’s contract to his membership of the employer’s 
board of trustees.248  It further stated that such clauses are impermissible, against 
public policy and incapable of consensual validation as parties cannot contract out of 
their rights conferred to them in terms of the LRA.249 
 
In Sindane250 the court distinguished the findings of Mampeule251 on the basis that in 
Mampeule the employment contract was terminated based on the employer’s 
decision to remove him from the board of directors following allegations of 
misconduct. In such circumstances the court held that he ought to have been given 
an opportunity to state his case and contest the fairness of his termination. 
 
On the other hand in Sindane the court ruled that there was no dismissal since the 
termination of employment was not the result of an act of an employer but was 
triggered by a third party.  It held that the employment contract was terminated as a 
result of a specified event as opposed to an overt act on the part of the employer.  In 
circumstances when an act of the employer is not the proximate cause of the 
termination of the employment contract it does not constitute dismissal.252  
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On appeal the LAC253 upheld the decision of the LC but based its findings on reliance 
on sections 5(2)(b) and 5(4) of the LRA.254  Section 5(2)(b) provides that no person 
may or threaten to prevent an employee or a person seeking employment from 
exercising any right conferred by this Act or from participating in any proceedings in 
terms of this Act.  Section 5(4) provides that a provision in any contracts that directly 
or indirectly contradicts or limits any provisions of section 4 and 5 is invalid unless the 
contractual provision is permitted by the LRA.   
 
It held that parties cannot contract out of the protection against unfair dismissal 
whether by means of an automatic termination clause or otherwise.  It further held 
that the onus rested with the employer to establish that the automatic termination 
clause prevailed over the relevant provisions of the LRA.  
 
The LAC held that section 5 of the LRA trumped the contractual provision as the 
employer had failed to offer a clear explanation as to why the automatic termination 
clause had been independently triggered and the only explicable motive appeared to 
be to circumvent the unfair dismissal provisions of the LRA. 
 
In Chillibush v Johnston255 the court held that a term in the contract of employment 
providing for automatic termination of employment contract when a board member 
who is also an employee is removed from the board contravenes section 185(a) of 
the LRA and cannot be permitted.  In this case, the shareholder’s agreement had a 
provision that states that should any shareholder cease to be a director or 
employment terminated by other shareholder, that shareholder would be obliged to 
resign as director and offer his shares for sale to other shareholders.  However, the 
employer argued that the employment contract terminated automatically.  The court 
held that it was not permissible to allow an employer to contractually negotiate the 
terms of a dismissal in advance in a contract of employment as that contravenes 
section 5(2)(b) of the LRA.  It also held that the removal of the employee from his 
post constitutes dismissal. 
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In Mahlamu v CCMA256 the Labour Court echoed a similar approach and held that a 
contractual device that renders a termination of a contract of employment to be 
something other than dismissal, with the result that the employee is denied the right 
to challenge the fairness thereof in terms of section 188 of the LRA, is precisely the 
mischief that section 5 of the LRA prohibits.  The court noted that statutory protection 
against unfair dismissal is a fundamental component of the constitutional right to fair 
labour practices that serves to protect the vulnerable by infusing fairness into the 
contractual relationship and the LRA must be purposively construed to give effect to 
this.  
 
In Nape V INTCC Corporate Solutions,257 the court correctly criticised the court 
finding in Sindane and noted that it placed too much emphasis on the rights of parties 
to contract out of the protection of the Act.  It stated that it is important to note the 
legality of the relationship on one hand and also the terms of the contract on the 
other hand.  This means that an employment relationship might be lawful but not all 
its terms may be.  The TES and its clients are not at liberty to enter into agreements 
that exploit employees. Clients have a responsibility not to harm the dignity of 
employees and undermine their right to fair labour practice. 
 
Mr Nape was employed by a TES (INTCS Corporate Solutions (Pty) Ltd whose client 
was Nissan (Pty) Ltd.  The employee committed misconduct at the client’s premises, 
subsequent to that, the client invoked its contractual rights and demanded that the 
TES remove Mr Nape from its premises.  Mr Nape was disciplined and given a 
sanction of a 12 month Final Written Warning.  However, the client was still not 
happy and refused to allow the employee on its premises.  The TES alleged that it 
had no choice but to invoke the provisions of section 189 of the LRA.258  An approach 
which the SCA259 noted should have been followed in Abancedisi.  
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In Nape the court held that the employer was legitimately entitled to dismiss the 
employee on grounds proven by the client to be reasonable and or substantively and 
procedurally fair.  It was also held that the employer was legitimately entitled to 
invoke section 189 of LRA.  
 
However, the contract between the client and the labour broker permitted termination 
of employment on any ground.  The employer argued that it simply exercised its right 
permitted by the contract and also that it had no alternative other than to retrench the 
employee.  Whilst the legality of the relationship between the client and the labour 
broker was lawful, the court held the terms of the contract on the other hand were not 
all lawful in that the provision that permitted termination of the employment contract 
for any reason was contrary to public policy, is in breach of the employee’s right to 
fair labour practices and was unenforceable. 
 
The court held that the client of a labour broker has a legal duty not to undermine an 
employee’s right to fair labour practices unless the limitation is justified by national 
legislation.  It noted further that there is nothing in section198 of the Act that indicates 
that a labour broker and a client may limit the right of an employee not to be unfairly 
dismissed and that the court is not bound by contractual limitations created by parties 
through an agreement that conflicts the fundamental rights of workers. 
 
According to Bosch260 there may be cases of extreme unfairness that might mean 
that the agreement is contrary to public policy and thus unenforceable.  He further 
states that the common law supplements the provisions of the written Constitution 
which is the supreme law.  However, the common law derives its force from the 
Constitution.  A right to fair labour practice and employee’s dignity can be said to 
have been violated by such clauses, thereby deemed to be against public policy and 
therefore unenforceable.  
 
The court viewed that labour brokers are not powerless when forced by the client to 
treat their employees unfairly.  They have options for example approaching a 
                                                     
260  Bosch “Contract as Barrier to Dismissals: The Plight of Labour Broker’s Employees 2008 ILJ 
813-840 820. 
84 
competent court to order the client to refrain from such conduct and also ordering the 
client to reinstate an unfairly dismissed employee.  
 
The challenge is that practical application of this view, since it has already been 
mentioned that clients are motivated to use labour brokers because of the relative 
ease to free themselves of their statutory obligations of which labour brokers are 
aware of.  It does not make sense as to why a labour broker would go to such extent 
and jeopardise its relationship with the client by ordering its client to reinstate the 
unfairly dismissed employee.  The practicality of this view could have a potential to 
harm the future financial and business opportunities between client and the labour 
broker. 
 
What is of note from the decision is that labour brokers my no longer hide behind the 
shield of commercial contracts to circumvent legislative protections against unfair 
dismissal as evidenced in Sindane.  As to why the court did not consider ordering the 
labour broker to consult the employees in terms of section 189 of LRA is not clear 
assuming that labour broker had other clients and could have tried to look for 
employment for the employee elsewhere.  It seems that the appropriate approach in 
such circumstances is the one followed in the recent judgement by the SCA in 
NUMSA v Abancedisi Labour Services.261 
 
The labour broker should redeploy the employee to other or clients.  Section 189(7) 
requires than an employer select employees to be dismissed for operational 
requirements according to a criteria to be agreed upon by the employer and 
representatives of the employees to be dismissed.  If no agreement reached, criteria 
that is fair and objective which may include Last In - First Out (hereafter referred to 
as “LIFO” must be followed. 
 
These court decisions clearly show that exploitation of employees of labour brokers 
will not escape judicial scrutiny and intervention. 
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8.2  TERMINATION AT THE INSTANCE OF A THIRD PARTY 
 
As discussed previously, in recent cases the courts have said termination at the 
insistence of third party, be it a client of a labour broker or a shareholder constitutes a 
dismissal.262  
 
In Livhadelo & Others v J&A Labour Contractors CC263 a TES dismissed the 
applicants after its client advised that the applicants were guilty of a serious 
misconduct, the client did not have concrete evidence to substantiate the allegations. 
The commissioner held that the TES, instead of taking the dismissal for operational 
requirements route, had chosen to take disciplinary action based on inadequate 
evidence and unfairly dismissed the applicants.  The applicants were awarded 
compensation.  
 
In Nkosi v Fidelity Security Services (Pty) Ltd264 the same principle was set out, 
where it was held that dismissal for misconduct is not the appropriate way of dealing 
with demands by an irate client who has no evidence of employee’s wrongdoing. 
However, in this case an employee had unreasonably refused another position he 
was offered and therefore compensation was limited to one month’s salary. 
 
With regard to the question of whether employees can contract out of protection by 
the LRA, this has also been answered in Mahlamu v CCMA.265  It was held that 
employees when acting as individuals seldom have power to waive or abandon rights 
that have been given to them by the legislature.  Further to that, an employee cannot 
contract out of his protection against unfair dismissal or renounce his right to bring 
such a claim whether that is expressly stated in a contract of employment.  This is 
exactly what section 5(2)(b) and 5(4) of the LRA266 are against. Contracting out of the 
right not to be unfairly dismissed is not permitted by the LRA. 
                                                     
262  Mahlamu v CCMA & others [2010] 4 BLLR 381 (LC); Nape V INTCC Corporate Solutions [2010} 
8 BLLR 852 (LC); Chilibush v Johnston [2010] 6 BLLR 607 (LC); SA Post office v Mampeule 
[2009] 8 BLLR 792 (LC); South African Post Office V Mampuele [2010] 10 BLLR 1052 (LAC). 
263  [2012] 5 BALR 439 (MEIBC). 
264  [2012] 4 BALR 432 (CCMA). 
265  [2011] 4 BLLR 381 (LC) 20. 
266  Act 66 of 1995.  
86 
 
Bosch267 states that it is of no consequence if the contract did not expressly exclude 
the application of the LRA to the relationship, what is of importance is the effect of 
such a clause, in this case the fact that employment would end automatically if the 
client advised for whatsoever reason.  If its intention is to limit the right conferred on 
the applicant by the LRA and Constitution, it is invalid, against public policy and 
unenforceable.  Bosch further stated that contracting out of protection against unfair 
dismissal is as good as contracting out of a right to fair labour practices. 
 
The BCEA268 states that an employer must give written particulars to an employee of 
the period of notice required to terminate employment, or if employment is for a 
specified period, the date when employment is to terminate.  In Khumalo v ESG 
Recruitment269 it was held that by not specifying an end date to the contract, the 
employer has created an opportunity for itself to avoid its obligations in terms of 
labour legislation and consequently deny employees their constitutional employment 
rights.270  
 
In Mampeule271 the LC further held that labour brokers must themselves adhere to 
the requirements of fairness before terminating the services of employees who have 
been dismissed by their clients.  This view was echoed in Nape v INTCS Corporate 
Solutions.272  The LRA273 protects employees against those who prevent them from 
exercising any right conferred by the Act.  Further to that a provision in any contract 
that limits or contradicts the provision of this section is invalid unless the contractual 
provision is permitted by this Act.   
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In Khumalo v ESG Recruitment274 it is stated that cancellation of labour broking 
contract by a client such termination is viewed as a dismissal for operational 
requirements.  
 
In Fidelity Supercare Services275 the employer relied on an automatic termination 
clause in an employment to terminate the contract, accordingly did not follow the 
procedure set in section 189 of the LRA.  It was held that the termination of 
employment constituted a dismissal that is both procedurally and substantively unfair.  
The arbitrator awarded severance pay in terms of section 41 of BCEA. 
 
8.3 TERMINATION DUE TO IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE 
 
In terms of the common law principles of contract, a contract terminates automatically 
when it becomes permanently impossible to perform the terms of the contract due to 
no fault on the part of either party.  The consequence would be the automatic 
termination of such a contract and will not constitute a dismissal.276  
 
Supervening impossibility of performance occurs when performance of the obligation 
is prevented by superior force that could not reasonable have been guarded 
against.277  The impossibility of performance must be absolute and be of a 
permanent nature otherwise such a claim will not withstand judicial scrutiny.  For 
example, death of an employee, imprisonment of an employee, strike action that 
prevents employees from working or employer from providing employment.  As 
indicated earlier, death of an employer does not necessarily mean termination of the 
employment contract.  
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8.3.1 TERMINATION AT THE INSTANCE OF SHAREHOLDERS 
 
In PG Group (Pty) Ltd v Mbambo NO278 the court rejected the defence of 
impossibility of performance where it had to consider whether a resolution by 
members of a company, removing the employee from office constituted a dismissal 
or not. In terms of section 220 of the Companies Act279 the members of a company in 
a general meeting may by extraordinary resolution remove directors before the 
expiration of their terms of office.  The employer argued that as the action of the 
shareholders were imposed on it by virtue of the articles of association and it had 
neither alternative nor discretion but to treat the appointment of the employee as 
having been terminated due to supervening impossibility of performance.  The court 
reasoned that one of a company’s primary rules of attribution is that the decision of 
members in a general meeting constitutes a decision of the company itself,280 it 
concluded that it was the employer, not its shareholders that dismissed the 
employee.281  
 
While shareholders have an unfettered discretion to terminate the directorship of any 
of its directors, they must bear in mind that the principles of fairness in terms of the 
LRA will prevail when it comes to dismissal of employees and not the principles of 
lawfulness, hence many a times employers relying on the impossibility of 
performance to justify automatic termination of the employment contract often do not 
succeed.  This was also confirmed in SA Post Office v Mampeule282 and Chillibush v 
Johnston.283  The mere fact that the employee is lawfully removed in terms of the 
Companies Act284 does not mean that he is deprived of the right to protection against 
unfair dismissal as labour law and company law essentially operate in their own 
spheres. 
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8.3.2  INCARCERATED EMPLOYEES 
 
In NUM v CCMA285 the LC was required to consider whether the inability of an 
employee to render services to the employer as a result of the employee’s 
incarceration gives rise to the impossibility of performance.  The employer argued 
that the incarceration resulted in the termination of the contract by operation of law.  
The Labour Court noted that when impossibility of performance of the contract is 
temporary, the employment contract is suspended for the period of incapacity 
however if permanent or for a lengthy period of time the contract terminates 
automatically by operation of law.  The court found that the commissioner had failed 
to enquire on whether the incapacity was permanent or temporal.  
 
In the absence of clear guidelines delineating temporary from permanent 
impossibility, this approach is likely to be fraught with uncertainty.286  
 
The LAC in Samancor Tubatse Ferrochrome v Metal & Engineering Industries 
Bargaining Council287 has advocated that such cases as incarceration of employees 
should be treated as incapacity and an employee should be given an opportunity to 
consider the reasons for incapacity and explore other alternatives to dismissal prior 
to taking a decision.  In this case the employee, after having been incarcerated for 
150 days was advised in writing by means of a letter addressed to the police station 
of his dismissal due to operational incapacity.  
 
The LAC noted that dismissals for incapacity should not be confined to the usual 
incapacity arising from ill-health, injury or poor performance.  It held that the 
determination of the fairness of a dismissal for incapacity depends on the facts of the 
matter.  
 
In view of the employer’s business requirements to fill the employee’s position and 
due to the uncertainty on the period of incarceration, the court ruled that the 
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dismissal of the employee due to operational incapacity was substantively fair even 
though procedurally unfair.  The procedural fairness was due to the fact that even 
though the employee was given an opportunity to be heard after his release, the fact 
that the same person who took a decision to dismiss presided over the post dismissal 
hearing appeared to be nothing more than a rationalisation of the earlier decision and 
rendered the process unfair.288 
 
This approach adopted by the LAC serves to reconcile the common law and statute 
by accommodating the common law principles of impossibility with the regulatory 
framework of the LRA.  In this way the employer’s common law rights to the 
employee’s uninterrupted services can be fairly balanced against the employee’s 
entitlement to a procedurally and substantively fair dismissal.289 
 
The Code of Good Practice: Dismissals290 acknowledges the fact that each dismissal 
case relating to the conduct and capacity is unique and departures from the norms 
established by the code may be justified in proper circumstances.  
 
Such circumstances anticipated in the code can be found in Samancor Tubatse 
Ferrochrome v Metal & Engineering Industries Bargaining Council.291  The 
uncertainty about the period of absence due to the incarceration posed a serious 
challenge for the employer hence a decision for replacement of the employee was 
justified.  As to whether a temporary replacement could have been employed is a 
question that would depend on facts for example the size of the enterprise and also 
on the nature of the incarcerated employee’s work. It is of significant importance that 
in this case the period of incarceration was not known.  
 
The key principle in the code292 is that there should be balance on the interest of the 
employee and interests of the business.  Employees should be protected from 
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arbitrary actions whilst employers are entitled to satisfactory conduct and work 
performance from their employees. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
 
An employment contract can be terminated by the general law of contract or common 
law principles and in part by specific statutory provisions of labour law.  
 
Under common law, the only requirement for termination of employment contract to 
be lawful was for the employer to give the required notice of termination of 
employment in terms of the contract.  Evidently, common law was not sufficient 
hence the employment contracts are regulated through various labour legislations 
including, the LRA, the BCEA and the EEA. 
 
In chapter three it was established that in resignation cases, an employee initiates 
the termination of the employment contract even if he or she later claims constructive 
dismissal and later argues that he had no choice but to terminate due to the 
employer making the conditions of employment intolerable for continued 
employment.  The concept of constructive dismissal is non- existent under the 
common law. 
 
The death of either party was dealt with in chapter four of the treatise. It was stated 
that the death of the employee will lead to the termination of the employment 
contract.  However, in terms of the common law, the death of an employer, a juristic 
person, its members or even a sole member will not necessarily lead to the 
termination of the contract. 
 
Chapter four dealt with desertion which occurs when an employee evinces a clear 
and unequivocal intention to abandon his work.  There is a distinction between 
desertion, asbcondment and absenteeism.  In abscondment cases an inference is 
made that an employee has no intention of returning to work while in absenteeism 
case an employee is merely not at work but intends to return to work. 
 
Desertion in the public sector is regulated by the PSA and EEA which contain 
“deeming provisions” stating that if an employee is absent from work for a certain 
93 
number of days, the employee will be deemed to have deserted, in such cases the 
courts have held that there is no dismissal as the termination is by operation of law.  
It the employment contract is terminated by operation of law an employee cannot 
refer a dismissal dispute to the CCMA or bargaining council. 
 
The constitutionality of the deeming provision has been challenged on the basis that 
it offends the right to fair labour practices as provided in section 23 of the 
Constitution. However the Constitutional court has held that it does not.  
 
In chapter six, it was discussed that the insolvency of the employee does not 
necessarily have an effect on the employment contract unless it is specified in the 
employment contract and if the insolvency of the employee precludes the employer 
from performing his or her duties.  Insolvency of the employer can either be as a 
result of voluntary liquidation or sequestration or compulsory winding-up of an 
employer.  
 
The courts have held that the termination of the employment contract as a result of 
voluntary liquidation or winding-up of an employer constitutes a dismissal since it is 
the decision of the employer to liquidate. 
 
In compulsory winding-up cases, the decision whether to wind up the company or not 
rests with the High court.  Therefore, the employment contract is not terminated by 
the employer and such termination does not constitute dismissal.  
 
Chapter seven dealt with termination of employment contract due to effluxion of time 
due to an employee reaching normal or agreed retirement age or due to the contract 
coming into being.  In such an instance there is no dismissal.  
 
Section 187(2)(b) of the LRA provides that a dismissal based on age is fair if the 
employee has reached the normal or agreed retirement age for  persons employed in 
that capacity. The wording of the section suggests that there is a dismissal however 
that the dismissal is fair if the employee has reached normal or agreed retirement 
age.  
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The courts are divided as to whether there is a dismissal or not.  In some judgements 
they have held that termination of the employment relationship on reaching an 
agreed or normal retirement age does not constitute a dismissal as defined in section 
188 of the LRA.  Where an employer does dismiss an employee before reaching the 
agreed or normal retirement age, once such an age is determined, it will be regarded 
as an automatically unfair dismissal based on age. 
 
When a fixed-term contract of employment comes to being, there is no dismissal; 
employment contract terminates by effluxion of time unless it is terminated 
prematurely. 
 
The employers’ reliance upon automatic termination clauses in employment contracts 
in order to to circumvent dismissal provisions of the LRA have been rejected by the 
courts.  The courts have also said that a contractual provision that has an effect of 
limiting legislative protection is invalid and contrary to the spirit and purport of the 
LRA. 
 
The abuse of automatic terminations has led to the need for an amendment of 
section 198 of the LRA through the insertion of section 198A which provides for a 
new type of dismissal namely, the termination by TES whether at the instance of the 
TES or client of employee’s assignment. 
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